Risks, responsibility and public respect: Cases of entrepreneurs elected in the USA and in Russia
Adam Smith pointed out public respect, prestige as significant component of compensation "for some employment" ("honorableness... of employment"). We assumed, the public moral sanction on success (Weber), public demand for "self-made man" should correlate positively with number of businessmen elected (US Senators, Russian governors and State Duma Deputies). Expressive voting of this sort could support positive pro-market patterns (create positive externalities) - contrary to the "expressive policy (behavior) trap" (Hillman, 2010). During the USA "classical" period ("First 150 years" M. Friedman recommended to take as a model for underdeveloped countries), successful entrepreneurs enjoyed obvious advantages in elections. The same was true for outstanding military-men, for civilian experienced in combat and decorated with awards it also greatly improved their chances to be elected. To hold military heroes in public respect was equivalent of public demand for more quality pure public good "defense" provision. Arising of leftist parties and coalitions, standing for mixed public goods priority provision, accompanied by sensible changes in public respect distribution. Lawyers, businessmen and army officers (military heroes) are crowded out by public servants, "social activists", public school teachers since "Universal Suffrage" institution introduction. In Russia, entrepreneurial status, especially a successful entrepreneurs status, is accompanied by no tangible public recognition. However, the self-esteem of individuals employed in business remains relatively high. The officers "ahead start" was almost unobservable in Russia after very first elections. With our data we also found that economic freedom indicators associated with greater prestige of entrepreneurs within society are positively correlated with voting for pro-market parties and negatively correlated with voting for left.
|Date of creation:||2013|
|Date of revision:||2013|
|Publication status:||Published Paper Series|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 3-5 Gazetny lane, Moscow, 125009|
Phone: (495) 629-6413
Fax: (495) 203-8816
Web page: http://iep.ru/en.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Konstantin Yanovskiy & Sergey Zhavoronkov & Ilia Zatcovetsky & Vladimir Lisin & Dmitry Cherny & Sergey Shulgin, 2015. "Institutional Constraints on Modern Economic Growth," Working Papers 0112, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2015.
- Konstantin Yanovsky & Daniel Shestakov, 2013. "The Gender Role of the Government: some explanations of family crisis," Working Papers 0061, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2013.
- Hillman,Arye L., 2009.
"Public Finance and Public Policy,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521738057, December.
- Hillman,Arye L., 2009. "Public Finance and Public Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521494267, November.
- Konstantin Yanovsky & Ilia Zatcovetzky & Georgy Syunyaev, 2013. "How safe is it, to Confuse Defense with Care?," Working Papers 0064, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2013.
- Hillman, Arye L., 2010. "Expressive behavior in economics and politics," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 403-418, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gai:ppaper:142. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Victor Hugues)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.