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Fatigue in dynamic tournaments

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  • Dmitry Ryvkin

    () (Department of Economics, Florida State University)

Abstract

Employee overwork and fatigue are a concern of managers in many organizations, as they may increase health and safety risks and decrease productivity. The problem is especially severe in competitive environments where compensation and promotions are awarded, explicitly or implicitly, on the basis of relative performance. In this paper, we propose a theory for, and study experimentally, the phenomenon of fatigue in dynamic contests aimed to mimic such settings. Theoretically, we find that if managers wish to avoid overwork, for example due to its negative impact on productivity, they should let their employees compete for promotion longer, with multiple intermediate performance evaluation stages. Experimentally, we find that subjects react strongly to changes in the environment related to fatigue and follow the comparative statics of equilibrium predictions. At the same time, within a given environment subjects behave as if they are unaware of the deteriorating effect of fatigue on their competitiveness. The results suggest that nonspecific information on consequences of fatigue is more effective than targeted information on how fatigue affects an employee’s chances of winning the competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Dmitry Ryvkin, 2009. "Fatigue in dynamic tournaments," Working Papers wp2009_06_03, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
  • Handle: RePEc:fsu:wpaper:wp2009_06_03
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Aner Sela, 2016. "Two Stage Contests With Effort-Dependent Rewards," Working Papers 1612, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    2. Antonio Filippin & Paolo Crosetto, 2016. "A Reconsideration of Gender Differences in Risk Attitudes," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(11), pages 3138-3160, November.
    3. Jeanine Miklós-Thal & Hannes Ullrich, 2016. "Career Prospects and Effort Incentives: Evidence from Professional Soccer," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(6), pages 1645-1667, June.
    4. repec:spr:reecde:v:21:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10058-017-0205-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
    6. Mago, Shakun & Sheremeta, Roman, 2018. "New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Multi-Battle Contests," MPRA Paper 85337, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Derek Clark & Tore Nilssen, 2013. "Learning by doing in contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 329-343, July.
    8. Erik O. Kimbrough & Kevin Laughren & Roman Sheremeta, 2017. "War and Conflict in Economics: Theories, Applications, and Recent Trends," Discussion Papers dp17-10, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    9. Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2014. "An experimental study of bidding in contests of incomplete information," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(2), pages 245-261, June.
    10. Zeynep B. Irfanoglu & Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2014. "The New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests," Working Papers 14-15, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    11. Irfanoglu, Zeynep & Mago, Shakun & Sheremeta, Roman, 2015. "New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests," MPRA Paper 67520, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Sela, Aner, 2016. "Two-stage contests with effort-dependent rewards," CEPR Discussion Papers 11113, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2013. "Fatigue and Team Performance in Soccer: Evidence from the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA European Championship," IZA Discussion Papers 7519, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    14. Deck, Cary & Sheremeta, Roman, 2015. "Tug-of-War in the Laboratory," MPRA Paper 67521, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Aner Sela & Eyal Erez, 2013. "Dynamic contests with resource constraints," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 863-882, October.
    16. Erez, Eyal & Sela, Aner, 2010. "Round-Robin Tournaments with Effort Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 8021, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. repec:eee:eecrev:v:100:y:2017:i:c:p:412-427 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    overwork; fatigue; dynamic contest; experiment;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General

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