Foreign Bidders Going Once, Going Twice... Protection in Government Procurement Auctions
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Other versions of this item:
- Matthew T. Cole & Ronald B. Davies, 2014. "Foreign bidders going once, going twice... Protection in government procurement auctions," Working Papers 201401, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
- Matthew T. Cole & Ronald B. Davies, 2014. "Foreign Bidders Going Once, Going Twice... Protection in Government Procurement Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 4691, CESifo Group Munich.
References listed on IDEAS
- McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1989. "Government procurement and international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 291-308, May.
- Miyagiwa, Kaz, 1991. "Oligopoly and Discriminatory Government Procurement Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1320-1328, December.
- Todd Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2012. "Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(2), pages 269-302, June.
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More about this item
KeywordsGovernment Procurement; Tariffs; Price Preference;
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-02-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2014-02-15 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-SOG-2014-02-15 (Sociology of Economics)
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