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Sharing the risk of settlement failure

Author

Listed:
  • Hiroshi Fujiki
  • Edward J. Green
  • Akira Yamazaki

Abstract

Two policies toward payments-system risk are common, but superficially appear to be contradictory. One policy is to restrict the exposure to risk generated by one participant to other participants who are, by one measure or another, directly concerned with the risky participant. The other policy is to provide a “safety net,” typically provided by government and funded by taxes collected from all participants and even from non-participants, to share losses due to “systemic risk.” In this paper, we provide a model in which both of these policies can be constituents of an economically efficient regime of payments-risk management.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiroshi Fujiki & Edward J. Green & Akira Yamazaki, 1999. "Sharing the risk of settlement failure," Working Papers 594, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmwp:594
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Freeman, Scott, 1996. "Clearinghouse banks and banknote over-issue," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 101-115, August.
    2. Freeman, Scott, 1996. "The Payments System, Liquidity, and Rediscounting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1126-1138, December.
    3. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1996. "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262150476, May.
    4. N/A, 1996. "Note:," Foreign Trade Review, , vol. 31(1-2), pages 1-1, January.
    5. Charles Goodhart, 1988. "The Evolution of Central Banks," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262570734, May.
    6. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 1996. "Interbank lending and systemic risk," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 733-765.
    7. Timberlake, Richard H, Jr, 1984. "The Central Banking Role of Clearinghouse Associations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(1), pages 1-15, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2000. "Financial Contagion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 1-33, February.
    2. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Ted Temzelides, 2005. "Mechanism Design and Payments," 2005 Meeting Papers 11, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Fujiki, Hiroshi & Green, Edward J. & Yamazaki, Akira, 2008. "Incentive efficient risk sharing in a settlement mechanism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 178-195, September.
    4. Lagunoff, Roger & Schreft, Stacey L., 2001. "A Model of Financial Fragility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 99(1-2), pages 220-264, July.
    5. Temzelides, Ted & Williamson, Stephen D., 2001. "Payments Systems Design in Deterministic and Private Information Environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 99(1-2), pages 297-326, July.
    6. Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, 2002. "Payments settlement under limited enforcement: Private versus public systems," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2002-33, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    7. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Theodosios Temzelides, 2007. "A dynamic model of the payment system," Working Papers 07-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    8. Williamson, Stephen D., 2003. "Payments systems and monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 475-495, March.
    9. Tore Nilssen, 2011. "Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 10(3), pages 211-234, December.
    10. Yamazaki, Akira, 1999. "Efficiency of Stochastic Transfers in a Directed Graph," Discussion Papers 1998-12, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    11. Koeppl, Thorsten & Monnet, Cyril & Temzelides, Ted, 2012. "Optimal clearing arrangements for financial trades," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 189-203.
    12. Thor Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Ted Temzelides, 2007. "Payments and Mechanism Design," Working Papers 1124, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    13. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1998. "Financial Contagion Journal of Political Economy," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 98-31, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    14. Stephen Williamson, 2000. "The Research Agenda: Payment Systems and Private Money," EconomicDynamics Newsletter, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(1), November.

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    Keywords

    Payment systems ; Risk management;

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