IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

A dynamic model of the payment system

  • Thorsten Koeppl
  • Cyril Monnet
  • Theodosios Temzelides

The authors study the design of efficient intertemporal payment arrangements when the ability of agents to perform certain welfare-improving transactions is subject to random and unobservable shocks. Efficiency is achieved via a payment system that assigns balances to participants, adjusts them based on the histories of transactions, and periodically resets them through settlement. Their analysis addresses two key issues in the design of actual payment systems. First, efficient use of information requires that agents participating in transactions that do not involve monitoring frictions subsidize those that are subject to such frictions. Second, the payment system should explore the trade-off between higher liquidity costs from settlement and the need to provide intertemporal incentives. In order to counter a higher exposure to default, an increase in settlement costs implies that the volume of transactions must decrease, but also that the frequency of settlement must increase. ; Also issued as Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper No. 07-14

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in its series Working Papers with number 07-22.

in new window

Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:07-22
Contact details of provider: Postal:
10 Independence Mall, Philadelphia, PA 19106-1574

Web page:

More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web: Email:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Hiroshi Fujiki & Edward J. Green & Akira Yamazaki, 1999. "Sharing the risk of settlement failure," Working Papers 594, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  2. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2005. "Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1587-1621, 09.
  3. Guillaume Rocheteau & Randall Wright, 2003. "Money in Search Equilibrium, in Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-031, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  4. Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2004. "A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis," Staff Report 346, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  5. M. Ruth & K. Donaghy & P. Kirshen, 2006. "Introduction," Chapters, in: Regional Climate Change and Variability, chapter 1 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  6. Stephen E. Spear & Sanjay Srivastava, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617.
  7. Aiyagari, S. Rao & Williamson, Stephen D., 2000. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 248-279, April.
  8. Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, . "Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 97-32, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  9. Koeppl, Thorsten Volker & Monnet, Cyril & Temzelides, Ted, 2006. "A dynamic model of settlement," Working Paper Series 0604, European Central Bank.
  10. Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, 2002. "The economics of payment finality," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q2, pages 1-12.
  11. Temzelides, Ted & Williamson, Stephen D., 2001. "Payments Systems Design in Deterministic and Private Information Environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 99(1-2), pages 297-326, July.
  12. Kahn, Charles M. & Roberds, William, 2001. "Real-time gross settlement and the costs of immediacy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 299-319, April.
  13. Nikolay Nenovsky & S. Statev, 2006. "Introduction," Post-Print halshs-00260898, HAL.
  14. Cyril Monnet & William Roberds, 2006. "Credit and the no-surcharge rule," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-25, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  15. Morten L. Bech & Rod Garratt, 2006. "Illiquidity in the interbank payment system following wide-scale disruptions," Staff Reports 239, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  16. Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1998. "Money Is Memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 232-251, August.
  17. Lacker, Jeffrey M. & Weinberg, John A., 2003. "Payment economics: studying the mechanics of exchange," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-387, March.
  18. Kahn, Charles M. & Roberds, William, 2009. "Why pay? An introduction to payments economics," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-23, January.
  19. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1989. "On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-54, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:07-22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Beth Paul)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.