Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives
In this article, we consider the relative merits of net versus gross settlement of interbank payments. Net settlement economizes on the costs of holding non-interest-bearing reserves, but increases moral hazard problems. The 'put option' value of default under net settlement can also distort banks' investment incentives. Absent these distortions, net settlement dominates gross, although the optimal net settlement scheme may involve a positive probability of default. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.
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Volume (Year): 11 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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