Optimal Public Procurement Contracts Under a Soft Budget Constraint
This paper presents a model where the central government cannot ensure that regional governments manage risks prudentially, due to soft budget constraint. Competition for project funding induces the regional governments use financial instruments as commitment devices as a signal of prudential risk management. A Public-Private Partnership contract, which delegates the monitoring task to a financial institute, is the most efficient commitment device provided that private financiers have an access to the same monitoring technology the regional governments fail to employ. The optimal capital structure of a PPP contract is a combination of public funds and debt from financial institutes. JEL Classification: D8, L3, H54, H57
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