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An Airline Merger and its Remedies: JAL-JAS of 2002

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  • DOI Naoshi
  • OHASHI Hiroshi

Abstract

This paper investigates the economic impacts of the merger between Japan Airlines (JAL) and Japan Air System (JAS) in October 2002 and its remedial measures. This paper performs simulation analyses using an estimated structural model in which airlines set both fares and flight frequencies on each route in the domestic market. By comparing supply models, the hypothesis that the merger caused a collusion among airlines is rejected. The marginal-cost estimates for the merging airlines significantly declined primarily through the expansion of its domestic network. The simulation estimates suggest that, although the merger increased the total social surplus for all domestic routes by 6.8%, it increased fares and decreased consumer surplus on the JAL-JAS duopoly routes. This paper also evaluates remedial measures associated with the merger.

Suggested Citation

  • DOI Naoshi & OHASHI Hiroshi, 2015. "An Airline Merger and its Remedies: JAL-JAS of 2002," Discussion papers 15100, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    • Handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:15100
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    References listed on IDEAS

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