Conventions for Selecting Among Conventions - An Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis
Conventions can be narrowly interpreted as coordinated ways of equilibrium play, i.e., a specific convention tells all players in a game with multiple strict equilibria which equilibrium to play. In our view, coordination often takes place before learning about the games. Thus, one has to coordinate on a prescribing principle of equilibrium selection. For the subclass of 2x2-bimatrix games with two strict equilibria we analyze the evolutionary stability of various such principles. In our experiment, we allow participants to first coordinate before playing various games. Based on between-subjects treatments, participants do this behind a complete (they know neither their role nor the game parameters), a partial (they know either their role or the game parameters) veil of ignorance, or with no ignorance (they know their role and the game parameters).
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