Quantity precommitment, Cournot outcome and asymmetric capacity costs
This note extends Kreps and Scheinkman's result -showing that a production capacity choice stage followed by price competition yields the same outcome as a Cournot game- to a setting where capacity costs are asymmetric.
|Date of creation:||11 Aug 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - pdf; pages: 8.|
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- Gabszewicz, J.J. & Poddar, S., .
"Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization under duopoly,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-1269, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jean J. Gabszewicz & Sougata Poddar, 1997. "Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization under duopoly," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 131-146.
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & PODDAR , Sougata, 1995. "Demand Fluctuations and Capacity Utilization under Duopoly," CORE Discussion Papers 1995051, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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