IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/emx/ceedoc/2021-11.html

Política Arancelaria Estratégica en la Guerra Comercial China-Estados Unidos

Author

Listed:
  • Diana Guadalupe Martínez Padilla

    (El Colegio de México)

  • Julen Berasaluce Iza

    (El Colegio de México)

Abstract

We introduce equilibrium indeterminacy into a two-country incomplete asset model with imperfect competition to analyze the role of self-fulfilling expectations or beliefs in explaining international business cycles. We find that when self-fulfilling beliefs are correlated with tecnology shocks, the model can account for the counter-cyclical behavior observed for the terms of trade and real net exports, while simultaneously generating higher volatilities relative to output, as in the data. The choice of the labor supply elasticity is shown to be critical for generating a negative correlation between the real exchange rate and relative consumption, thereby resolving the Backus-Smith puzzle.

Suggested Citation

  • Diana Guadalupe Martínez Padilla & Julen Berasaluce Iza, 2021. "Política Arancelaria Estratégica en la Guerra Comercial China-Estados Unidos," Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos 2021-11, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos.
    • Handle: RePEc:emx:ceedoc:2021-11
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cee.colmex.mx/dts/2021/DT-2021-11.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1990. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Erratum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 641-642, June.
    2. Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L.-C. Lai, 2006. "International Protection of Intellectual Property: Corrigendum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 456-456, March.
    3. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2005. "A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(4), pages 1239-1282.
    4. Motta, Massimo, 1996. "Research joint ventures in an international economy," Ricerche Economiche, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 293-315, September.
    5. Emily J. Blanchard & Chad P. Bown & Robert C. Johnson, 2016. "Global Supply Chains and Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 21883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1984. "Trade warfare: Tariffs and cartels," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3-4), pages 227-242, May.
    7. Willmann, Gerald, 2003. "Why Legislators are Protectionists: The Role of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffs," Economics Working Papers 2003-10, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
    8. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-1306, December.
    9. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-985, December.
    10. Markusen, James R & Wigle, Randall M, 1989. "Nash Equilibrium Tariffs for the United States and Canada: The Roles of Country Size, Scale Economies, and Capital Mobility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(2), pages 368-386, April.
    11. Chattopadhyay, Subir & Mitka, Malgorzata M., 2019. "Nash equilibrium in tariffs in a multi-country trade model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 225-242.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Olper, Alessandro, . "The political economy of trade-related regulatory policy: environment and global value chain," Bio-based and Applied Economics Journal, Italian Association of Agricultural and Applied Economics (AIEAA), vol. 5(3).
    2. Leahy, Dermot & Neary, J. Peter, 2007. "Absorptive capacity, R&D spillovers, and public policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1089-1108, October.
    3. Celik, Levent & Karabay, Bilgehan & McLaren, John, 2013. "Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-190.
    4. Grunfeld, Leo A., 2003. "Meet me halfway but don't rush: absorptive capacity and strategic R&D investment revisited," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(8), pages 1091-1109, October.
    5. Prokop, Jacek & Karbowski, Adam, 2013. "R&D cooperation and industry cartelization," Economics Discussion Papers 2013-41, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    6. Levy, Nadav, 2012. "Technology sharing and tacit collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 204-216.
    7. Vasileios Zikos, 2010. "R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 77(1), pages 189-212, July.
    8. Julia Müller & Thorsten Upmann, 2026. "Returns to Scale and Strategic Regimes in Innovation Races," CESifo Working Paper Series 12552, CESifo.
    9. Buccella, Domenico & Fanti, Luciano & Gori, Luca, 2021. "A contribution to the theory of R&D investments," GLO Discussion Paper Series 940, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    10. Scaringella, Laurent & Burtschell, François, 2017. "The challenges of radical innovation in Iran: Knowledge transfer and absorptive capacity highlights — Evidence from a joint venture in the construction sector," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 151-169.
    11. Changying Li & Jianhu Zhang, 2013. "Dynamic Games of R&D Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(4), pages 660-679, December.
    12. Besanko, David & Tong, Jian & Wu, Jianjun, 2016. "Subsidizing research programs with "if" and "when" uncertainty in the face of severe informational constraints," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1605, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    13. Odagiri, Hiroyuki & Nakamura, Yoshiaki & Shibuya, Minoru, 1997. "Research consortia as a vehicle for basic research: The case of a fifth generation computer project in Japan," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 191-207, May.
    14. Michael D. König & Xiaodong Liu & Yves Zenou, 2019. "R&D Networks: Theory, Empirics, and Policy Implications," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 476-491, July.
    15. Amir, Rabah & Wooders, John, 2000. "One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 1-25, April.
    16. Amoroso, S., 2013. "Heterogeneity of innovative, collaborative, and productive firm-level processes," Other publications TiSEM f5784a49-7053-401d-855d-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    17. Isabel Maria Medalho Pereira, 2007. "Business-Science Research Collaboration under Moral Hazard," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 721.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    18. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2015. "Research clusters: How public subsidies matter?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01159523, HAL.
    19. Roma, Paolo & Perrone, Giovanni, 2016. "Cooperation among competitors: A comparison of cost-sharing mechanisms," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 172-182.
    20. Sonia Falconieri & Frederic Palomino & Jozsef Sakovics, 2002. "Collective vs. Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 85, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
    • F44 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Business Cycles

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:emx:ceedoc:2021-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ximena Varela (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cecolmx.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.