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Market structure and borrower welfare in microfinance

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  • Fetzer, Thiemo
  • de Quidt, Jonathan

Abstract

Motivated by recent controversies surrounding the role of commercial lenders in microfinance, we analyze borrower welfare under different market structures, considering a benevolent non-profit lender, a for-profit monopolist, and a competitive credit market. To understand the magnitude of the effects analyzed, we simulate the model with parameters estimated from the MIX Market database. Our results suggest that market power can have severe implications for borrower welfare, while despite possible information frictions competition typically delivers similar borrower welfare to non-profit lending. In addition, for-profit lenders are less likely to use joint liability than non-profits.

Suggested Citation

  • Fetzer, Thiemo & de Quidt, Jonathan, 2012. "Market structure and borrower welfare in microfinance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58164, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:58164
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    Cited by:

    1. Chowdhury, Shyamal & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy & Sengupta, Kunal, 2014. "Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 167-180.
    2. de Quidt, Jonathan & Fetzer, Thiemo & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2018. "Commercialization and the decline of joint liability microcredit," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 209-225.
    3. Ahlin, Christian & Waters, Brian, 2016. "Dynamic microlending under adverse selection: Can it rival group lending?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 237-257.
    4. Ahmad, Syedah & Lensink, Robert & Mueller, Annika, 2020. "The double bottom line of microfinance: A global comparison between conventional and Islamic microfinance," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    5. repec:cep:stieop:44 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Abhirupa Das & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2022. "Microfinance institution and moneylenders in a segmented rural credit market," Working papers 324, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    7. Tristan Caballero-Montes, 2023. "Integrating market conditions into regulatory decisions on microfinance interest rates: does competition matter?," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 201-232, June.
    8. Amin Karimu & Samuel Salia & Javed G. Hussain & Ishmael Tingbani, 2021. "Are competitive microfinance services worth regulating? Evidence from microfinance institutions in Sub‐Saharan Africa," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(1), pages 476-492, January.
    9. Moh’d Al-Azzam & Christopher Parmeter, 2021. "Competition and microcredit interest rates: international evidence," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 829-868, February.
    10. Allen, Treb, 2016. "Optimal (partial) group liability in microfinance lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 201-216.
    11. Nitin Navin & Pankaj Sinha, 2019. "Market Structure and Competition in the Indian Microfinance Sector," Vikalpa: The Journal for Decision Makers, , vol. 44(4), pages 167-181, December.
    12. Kaniska Dam & Prabal Roy Chowdhuri, 2015. "Incentives and Competition in Microfinance," Working papers DTE 579, CIDE, División de Economía.
    13. Baland, Jean-Marie & Somanathan, Rohini & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2013. "Repayment incentives and the distribution of gains from group lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 131-139.
    14. Ahlin, Christian, 2015. "The role of group size in group lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 140-155.
    15. de Quidt, Jonathan & Fetzer, Thiemo & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2016. "Group lending without joint liability," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 217-236.
    16. Catalina Martinez, 2015. "Doing Well by Doing Good? Empirical Evidence from Microfinance," CFD Working Papers 06-2015, Centre for Finance and Development, The Graduate Institute.
    17. Meishan Jiang & Krishna P. Paudel & Fan Zou, 2020. "Do Microcredit Loans Do What They Are Intended To Do? A Case Study of the Credit Village Microcredit Programme in China," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(5), pages 763-792, July.
    18. Shahid Razzaque, 2019. "Choice of Microfinance Contracts and Repayment Rates under Individual Lending: An Artefactual Field Experiment from Pakistan," PIDE-Working Papers 2019:166, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
    19. Shyamal Chowdhury & Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Kunal Sengupta, 2014. "Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance," Discussion Papers 14-07, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    20. Giné, Xavier & Karlan, Dean S., 2014. "Group versus individual liability: Short and long term evidence from Philippine microcredit lending groups," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 65-83.
    21. Lutz G. Arnold & Benedikt Booker & Gregor Dorfleitner & Michaela Röhe, 2016. "Refinancing MFIs with Market Power: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 162, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    22. Shapiro, D.A., 2015. "Microfinance and dynamic incentives," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 73-84.
    23. Lutz G. Arnold & Benedikt Booker & Gregor Dorfleitner & Michaela Röhe, 2021. "Refinancing MFIs with market power: theory and evidence," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1485-1505, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    microfinance; market power; for-profit; social capital;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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