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Asymmetric Group Loan Contracts : Experimental Evidence

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  • Carli, Francesco
  • Suetens, Sigrid

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Uras, Burak

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Visser, Philine

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Carli, Francesco & Suetens, Sigrid & Uras, Burak & Visser, Philine, 2021. "Asymmetric Group Loan Contracts : Experimental Evidence," Discussion Paper 2021-024, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:918d8091-4038-4d14-af04-84076368f1fd
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    Keywords

    group loan contracts; asymmetric contracts; joint liability; coordination game; microfinance; laboratory experiment;
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