Group lending and individual lending with strategic default
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Cited by:
- Chowdhury, Shyamal & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy & Sengupta, Kunal, 2014.
"Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance,"
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- Altınok, Ahmet & Sever, Can, 2014. "Efficient Microlending without Joint Liability," MPRA Paper 56598, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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- Attanasio, Orazio & Augsburg, Britta & De Haas, Ralph & Fitzsimons, Emla & Harmgart, Heike, 2011. "Group lending or individual lending? Evidence from a randomised field experiment in Mongolia," MPRA Paper 35439, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Renuka Sane & Susan Thomas, 2012. "What should regulation do in the field of micro-finance?," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2012-012, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
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"Recent Advances in Lending to the Poor with Asymmetric Information,"
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"Group lending without joint liability,"
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Keywords
Group lending Individual lending Strategic default Collusion Joint liability Microfinance;Statistics
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