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Sub-federal administrative regulation of entry in Russia

Author

Listed:
  • Kolomak Evgeniya

Abstract

The project assesses the sub-federal regulation of market entry around Russian regions by addressing two problems: what are the consequences of the regulation and what determines the variation of the market entry regulation among the regions. Assumptions of public interest regulation and public choice theories are tested. Empirical base of the project is the constructed data set, describing the administrative regulation of entry by start-up companies in Russian regions.

Suggested Citation

  • Kolomak Evgeniya, 2007. "Sub-federal administrative regulation of entry in Russia," EERC Working Paper Series 07-03e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    • Handle: RePEc:eer:wpalle:07-03e
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Regulation of Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37.
    3. Phyllis Dininio & Robert W. Orttung, 2004. "Explaining Patterns of Corruption in the Russian Regions," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 727, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    4. Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, 1981. "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in Public Regulation, pages 1-78, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "Local Corruption and Global Capital Flows," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 31(2), pages 303-354.
    6. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-781, August.
    7. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    8. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Cited by:

    1. Veronika MASLIKHINA, 2018. "Patterns Of Spatial Development: Evidence From Russia," Regional Science Inquiry, Hellenic Association of Regional Scientists, vol. 0(2), pages 153-161, July.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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