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Relative property rights in transition economies: Can the oligarchs be productive?

  • Gorodnichenko Yury

    ()

  • Grigorenko Yegor

    ()

  • Ostanin Dmytro

    ()

Registered author(s):

    Empirical evidence suggests that Ukrainian ferrous metal industry exhibits extremely low capacity utilization rates. This project seeks to explain this phenomenon within the framework of the property rights approach. A solution to the problem is proposed via introduction of the third party between primary producing firms. Policy implications will be developed.

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    File URL: https://eercnetwork.com/default/download/creater/working_papers/file/5603962df82b271bf4efbddd4fad830c74801e0c.pdf
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    Paper provided by EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS in its series EERC Working Paper Series with number 06-04e.

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    Date of creation: 26 Apr 2006
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:eer:wpalle:06-04e
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    Order Information: Postal: EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS, 92/94, Dmytrivska Str., suite 404, Kyiv, 01135 Ukraine
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    1. David de Meza & Ben Lockwood, 1998. "Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(2), pages 361-386.
    2. Kornai, Janos, 1992. "The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198287766, December.
    3. Francesca Pissarides & Miroslav Singer & Jan Svejnar, 2000. "Objectives and Constraints of Entrepreneurs: Evidence from Small and Medium Size Enterprises in Russia and Bulgaria," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 346, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    4. Dalia Marin & Monika Schnitzer, 2002. "Contracts in Trade and Transition: The Resurgence of Barter," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262133997, December.
    5. Simeon Djankov & Peter Murrell, 2002. "Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(3), pages 739-792, September.
    6. Jan Svejnar & Evzen Kocenda, 2002. "The Effects of Ownership Forms and Concentration on Firm Performance after Large-Scale Privatization," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 471, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    7. Roman Frydman & Cheryl Gray & Marek Hessel & Andrzej Rapaczynski, 1999. "When Does Privatization Work? The Impact of Private Ownership on Corporate Performance in the Transition Economies," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1153-1191.
    8. Vella, Francis & Verbeek, Marno, 1999. "Estimating and Interpreting Models with Endogenous Treatment Effects," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 17(4), pages 473-78, October.
    9. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817, December.
    10. Daron Acemoglu, 2003. "The Form of Property Rights: Oligarchic vs. Democratic Societies," NBER Working Papers 10037, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Perotti, Enrico C. & Gelfer, Stanislav, 2001. "Red barons or robber barons? Governance and investment in Russian financial-industrial groups," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1601-1617, October.
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