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Desafíos metodológicos de los Sistemas de Evaluación e Incentivos en Educación. El caso del SNED en Chile (Methodological challenges for evaluation and incentive systems in education. The case of SNED in Chile)

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  • Alejandra Mizala
  • Pilar Romaguera

Abstract

En este trabajo se analizan los desafíos más importantes que enfrentan los sistemas de evaluación e incentivos, esto es, qué elementos considerar en la medición del desempeño del establecimiento escolar y cómo comparar entre establecimientos educacionales que atienden a una población de distinto nivel socioeconómico. Este análisis es fundamentalmente metodológico y se realiza respecto del Sistema Nacional de Evaluación del Desempeño Docente (SNED) aplicado en Chile desde 1996. Se contrastan, tanto distintos indicadores que pueden utilizarse para evaluar los establecimientos educacionales, como metodologías de comparación entre establecimientos. El análisis permite determinar en qué medida estos indicadores y metodologías de comparación entregan resultados más o menos equitativos a la hora de premiar establecimientos educativos. Se concluye con implicaciones de estos resultados en el ámbito del diseño de sistemas de incentivos en educación y el aporte que pueden tener estos sistemas a la política educacional.

Suggested Citation

  • Alejandra Mizala & Pilar Romaguera, 2003. "Desafíos metodológicos de los Sistemas de Evaluación e Incentivos en Educación. El caso del SNED en Chile (Methodological challenges for evaluation and incentive systems in education. The case of SNED in Chile)," Documentos de Trabajo 159, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  • Handle: RePEc:edj:ceauch:159
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    References listed on IDEAS

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