Mixed Oligopoly and Entry
We analyze a mixed oligopoly with free entry by private firms. It is assumed that a state-owned enterprise (SOE) maximizes an increasing function of output, subject to a break-even constraint. We first show that, because of instability, the industry cannot contain more than one SOE. Then we establish an irrelevance result: if the SOE's cost disadvantage relative to private firms is not too large, then aggregate output, aggreagte costs and welfare are the same with and without the SOE. However, for this range of cost disadvantage an SOE monopoly yields higher welfare. Implications for privatization policy are suggested.
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- Philippe De Donder & John E. Roemer, 2006.
"Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms' Objectives Are Endogenous,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1581, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- De Donder, Philippe & Roemer, John E., 2009. "Mixed oligopoly equilibria when firms' objectives are endogenous," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 414-423, May.
- De Donder, Philippe & Roemer, John E, 2006. "Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms' Objectives Are Endogenous," CEPR Discussion Papers 5900, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Philippe De Donder & John E. Roemer, 2006. "Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms' Objectives Are Endogenous," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000436, UCLA Department of Economics.
- De Donder, Philippe & Roemer, John, 2006. "Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria when Firms' Objectives are Endogenous," IDEI Working Papers 414, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x.
- Yoshihiro Tomaru & Yasuhiko Nakamura & Masayuki Saito, 2011. "Strategic Managerial Delegation In A Mixed Duopoly With Capacity Choice: Partial Delegation Or Full Delegation," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 79(4), pages 811-838, 07.
- Massimo Florio, 2014. "The return of public enterprise," Working Papers 201401, Centre for Industrial Studies (CSIL).
- Matsumura, Toshihiro, 1998. "Partial privatization in mixed duopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 473-483, December.
- Estrin, Saul & de Meza, David, 1995. "Unnatural monopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 471-488, July.
- de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1990. " Game Theoretic Models of Mixed Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17.
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