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Do You a Favor? Social Implications of High Aspirations in Negotiation

Author

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  • Bowles, Hannah Riley

    (Harvard U)

  • Babcock, Linda

    (Carnegie Mellon U)

  • Lai, Lei

Abstract

Study explores implications of high aspirations for potential future cooperation with one’s negotiating counterpart. Participants were 134 undergraduate students acting as buyers or sellers in a price negotiation. Buyers were assigned more or less ambitious aspirations. Buyers with more ambitious aspirations negotiated a greater percentage of the surplus. Sellers paired with buyers with more ambitious aspirations were less satisfied with the negotiation outcome, found their negotiating counterparts to be less likeable, expressed less willingness to work with or do a favor for their negotiating counterparts, and were less generous toward their counterparts when allocating money in a post-negotiation decision exercise. Likeability of the buyer mediated the effect of buyer aspiration level on sellers’ satisfaction and willingness to cooperate in future.

Suggested Citation

  • Bowles, Hannah Riley & Babcock, Linda & Lai, Lei, 2004. "Do You a Favor? Social Implications of High Aspirations in Negotiation," Working Paper Series rwp04-033, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp04-033
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    File URL: https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=133
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, 1997. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 109-126, Winter.
    2. Oliver, Richard L. & Balakrishnan, P. V. (Sundar) & Barry, Bruce, 1994. "Outcome Satisfaction in Negotiation: A Test of Expectancy Disconfirmation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 252-275, November.
    3. White, Sally Blount & Neale, Margaret A., 1994. "The Role of Negotiator Aspirations and Settlement Expectancies in Bargaining Outcomes," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 303-317, February.
    4. O'Connor, Kathleen M. & Arnold, Josh A., 2001. "Distributive Spirals: Negotiation Impasses and the Moderating Role of Disputant Self-Efficacy," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 148-176, January.
    5. Barry, Bruce & Oliver, Richard L., 1996. "Affect in Dyadic Negotiation: A Model and Propositions," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 127-143, August.
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