Can institutional forces create competitive advantage? An empirical examination of environmental innovation
We examine institutional pressures as antecedents of environmental innovation. Drawing on institutional theory and a resource-based view of the firm, we argue that regulatory and normative forces influence companies' propensity to innovate in environment-related projects. Furthermore, we suggest that this relationship is contingent on the availability and specificity of the companies' resources. These relationships were tested using environmental patents and citations of 340 publicly-traded companies from polluting industries in the U.S. Results suggest that institutional pressures can be a source of competitive advantage, and regulatory forces are becoming more strongly associated with environmental innovations as the intensity of companies' R&D activities increase.
|Date of creation:||21 Nov 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.iese.edu/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lanjouw, Jean Olson & Mody, Ashoka, 1996. "Innovation and the international diffusion of environmentally responsive technology," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 549-571, June.
- Anton, Wilma Rose Q. & Deltas, George & Khanna, Madhu, 2002.
"Incentives for Environmental Self-Regulation and Implications for Environmental Performance,"
02-0120, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
- Anton, W.R.Q.Wilma Rose Q. & Deltas, George & Khanna, Madhu, 2004. "Incentives for environmental self-regulation and implications for environmental performance," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 632-654, July.
- Glen Dowell & Stuart Hart & Bernard Yeung, 2000. "Do Corporate Global Environmental Standards Create or Destroy Market Value?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(8), pages 1059-1074, August.
- Cohen, Mark A, 1987. "Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 23-51, April.
- Andrew King & Michael Lenox, 2002. "Exploring the Locus of Profitable Pollution Reduction," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(2), pages 289-299, February.
- Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
- Richard Makadok & Jay B. Barney, 2001. "Strategic Factor Market Intelligence: An Application of Information Economics to Strategy Formulation and Competitor Intelligence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(12), pages 1621-1638, December.
- Adam B. Jaffe & Karen Palmer, 1997.
"Environmental Regulation And Innovation: A Panel Data Study,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 79(4), pages 610-619, November.
- Adam B. Jaffe & Karen Palmer, 1996. "Environmental Regulation and Innovation: A Panel Data Study," NBER Working Papers 5545, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Khanna, Madhu & Damon, Lisa A., 1999. "EPA's Voluntary 33/50 Program: Impact on Toxic Releases and Economic Performance of Firms," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-25, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0723. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Noelia Romero)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.