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Profit-Sharing as Tax Saving and Incentive Device

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The theory of labor contract with worker’s chosen effort level mainly rests upon the principal-agent paradigm. In many labor markets however, the principal is not as free as assumed in the standard theory, but is submitted to some binding institutional constraints. It is requested in particular to post a wage level, i.e. a non random component of compensation to which high rates of social contribution may apply. The proposed model adapts the standard analysis to situations in which tax rules and possibly predetermined profit-sharing patterns interfere with free contracting. It formalizes the two-faced aspect of profit sharing having an impact on the firm’s objective through tax saving effect and incentive effect.

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  • Chau, Minh & Contensou, François, 2004. "Profit-Sharing as Tax Saving and Incentive Device," ESSEC Working Papers DR 04012, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-04012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Profit-sharing; Incentives; Tax evasion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law

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