Understanding Fundamentalist Belief Through Bayesian Updating
Using Bayesian updating to deterministic priors persistence of fundamentalist belief like those in the mind of a terrorist is explained. Under such belief system if conditional evidence is diametrically opposite and also deterministic then a process of change will set in and in the present war against terrorism this can be effectively done through Islamic religious authorities. In situations where interaction is the basis, self-defeating scenarios can be avoided by giving space to others. Thus, in the political sphere one has to be accommodative about the concerns of Middle East, this will also make things easier for intervention through Islam.
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