Conflict Resolution through Mutuality: Lessons from Bayesian Updating
If priors are deterministic (zero or unity) and conditional evidence is uncertain (lies between zero and one) then Bayesian updating will lead to posteriors that are the same as priors. This in a sense explains the persistence of fundamentalist belief. Under such a belief system, only if conditional evidence is deterministic and diametrically opposite to that of the prior then a process of change can set in. Conflict resolution is possible through dialogues that calls for mutual respect and allows reasonable pluralism - a Rawlsian prerequisite. If interaction is the basis then self-defeating scenarios can be avoided by giving space to others. Thus, in the political sphere one has to be accommodative.
Volume (Year): 9 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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