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Quelle théorie pour la gouvernance?De la gouvernance actionnariale à la gouvernance cognitive et comportementale

Author

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  • Gérard Charreaux

    () (Université de Bourgogne, LEG (FARGO)-UMR 5118)

Abstract

Le champ du gouvernement ou de la gouvernance des entreprises est constitué par l’analyse des règles du jeu managérial, lesquelles, en encadrant la latitude décisionnelle des dirigeants, conditionnent la création de valeur organisationnelle et, plus globalement, la performance économique. Cet article a deux principaux objectifs. Premièrement, il vise à présenter les principales théories de la gouvernance en explicitant les modèles de création et de répartition de la valeur qui les sous-tendent. Au-delà de la vision financière actionnariale qui domine le champ des recherches en gouvernance mais dont le pouvoir explicatif est limité, sont également présentées les visions contractuelles partenariales qui prennent en compte l’ensemble des parties prenantes et les visions cognitives qui s’appuient sur une analyse différente de la création de valeur fondée sur les notions de connaissance et de compétence. Ces deux visions sont complétées par la prise en compte de la dimension comportementale associée aux biais affectant les décisions managériales. Deuxièmement, il cherche à préciser les conséquences de ces différentes théories tant pour expliquer la configuration et le fonctionnement des systèmes de gouvernance que pour éclairer les débats visant à identifier et imposer un système optimal de gouvernance.

Suggested Citation

  • Gérard Charreaux, 2011. "Quelle théorie pour la gouvernance?De la gouvernance actionnariale à la gouvernance cognitive et comportementale," Working Papers CREGO 1110402, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1110402
    Note: Ce texte est une version révisée d’un texte antérieur publié sous le titre «Le gouvernement des entreprises» dans J. Allouche (Coord.), Encyclopédie des ressources humaines, Vuibert, 2e édition, 2006. Il sera publié dans la 3ème édition.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mary O’Sullivan & William Lazonick, "undated". "Corporate Governance and the Innovative Economy: Policy Implications," STEP Report series 199803, The STEP Group, Studies in technology, innovation and economic policy.
    2. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2000. "Investor protection and corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 3-27.
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    4. repec:hrv:faseco:30728046 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Gérard Charreaux, 2009. "Droit et gouvernance:l’apport du courant comportemental," Working Papers CREGO 1091001, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    6. Gérard Charreaux, 2004. "Les théories de la gouvernance:de la gouvernance des entreprises à la gouvernance des systèmes nationaux," Working Papers CREGO 1040101, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    7. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mohamed Khenissi & Peter Wirtz, 2013. "Processus Decisionnel En Matiere De Remuneration Des Dirigeants : Le Cas Vinci," Working Papers halshs-00850083, HAL.
    2. repec:taf:oaefxx:v:4:y:2016:i:1:p:1230958 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    gouvernance actionnariale; gouvernance partenariale; gouvernance cognitive; gouvernance comportementale.;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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