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Droit et gouvernance:l’apport du courant comportemental

  • Gérard Charreaux

    ()

    (Université de Bourgogne)

Dans le cadre de l’approche dominante de la gouvernance, le rôle du droit est d’aider à réduire les conséquences des conflits d’intérêts et des comportements stratégiques intentionnels des différents acteurs, notamment des dirigeants. Les décisions des dirigeants préjudiciables aux actionnaires et aux autres parties prenantes ne relèvent cependant pas toutes d’un comportement volontaire. Certaines résultent d’erreurs de jugement, de biais cognitifs et comportementaux. Sur la base du courant Behavioral Law and Economics qui s’est fortement développé aux Etats-Unis, l’objectif de l’article est de montrer que le rôle du droit à l’intérieur du système de gouvernance est également de contribuer à « débiaiser » les décisions ou à corriger les conséquences défavorables de ces biais.

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Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 1091001.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1091001
Contact details of provider: Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

Order Information: Postal: Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
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  1. Michael C. Jensen, 2005. "Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 34(1), Spring.
  2. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, 2006. "Debiasing through Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 199-242, 01.
  3. Hirshleifer, David, 2007. "Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation," MPRA Paper 5129, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Roll, Richard, 1986. "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 197-216, April.
  5. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, 2003. "Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 48(Jun).
  6. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
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