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Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions

  • Marco CATENARO

    (European Central Bank)

  • Jean-Pierre VIDAL

    (European Central Bank)

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    In the context of a stylised gaine theoretical framework of capital tax competition, we show that when repeated policy interactions are associated to a systematic punishment of the deviating policymaker, a coordinated outcome can be the solution to the non cooperative tax game. This resuit suggests that explicit forms of policy coordination, such as a centralised tax authority, could in fact be largely unnecessary.

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    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/REL/2006011.pdf
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    Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) with number 2006011.

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    Length: 14
    Date of creation: 01 Mar 2006
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2006011
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    1. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
    2. Cardarelli, R. & Taugourdeau, E. & Vidal, J.-P., 1999. "A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 99a34, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
    3. Coates, Dennis, 1993. "Property tax competition in a repeated game," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 111-119, March.
    4. Signe Krogstrup, 2003. "Are Capital Taxes Racing to the Bottom in the European Union?," IHEID Working Papers 01-2003, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    5. WILDASIN, David, . "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," CORE Discussion Papers RP -804, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Razin, A. & Sadka, E., 1991. "International Fiscal Policy Coordination and Competition," Papers 3-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
    7. Wilson, J.D., 1990. "Tax Competition With Interregional Differences In Factor Endowments," Working Papers 4, John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy.
    8. Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, 1994. "Tax competition and Leviathon," IFS Working Papers W94/07, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    9. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
    10. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
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