IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mhr/finarc/urnsici0015-2218(201412)704_556ftiarm_2.0.tx_2-p.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Fiscal Transfer in a Repeated-Interaction Model of Tax Competition

Author

Listed:
  • Wenming Wang
  • Keisuke Kawachi
  • Hikaru Ogawa

Abstract

This paper analyzes how a fiscal transfer scheme affects tax cooperation in a repeated-interaction model of tax competition. In particular, the paper studies whether a fiscal transfer scheme promotes or blocks voluntary tax cooperation. It is shown that the larger the scale of fiscal transfer is, the easier voluntary tax cooperation is, implying that interregional transfers for correcting fiscal gaps are consistent with voluntary tax cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Wenming Wang & Keisuke Kawachi & Hikaru Ogawa, 2014. "Fiscal Transfer in a Repeated-Interaction Model of Tax Competition," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 70(4), pages 556-566, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(201412)70:4_556:ftiarm_2.0.tx_2-p
    DOI: 10.1628/001522108X685483
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mohr/fa/2014/00000070/00000004/art00004
    Download Restriction: Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nelly Exbrayat & Stéphane Riou & Thierry Madies, 2007. "International public goods and asymmetric tax competition," Post-Print ujm-00162734, HAL.
    2. Hindriks, Jean & Peralta, Susana & Weber, Shlomo, 2008. "Competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2392-2402, December.
    3. Robin Boadway, 2006. "Intergovernmental Redistributive Transfers: Efficiency and Equity," Chapters,in: Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, chapter 14 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Cardarelli, Roberto & Taugourdeau, Emmanuelle & Vidal, Jean-Pierre, 2002. " A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(1), pages 19-38.
    5. Keisuke Kawachi & Hikaru Ogawa, 2006. "Further Analysis on Public-Good Provision in a Repeated-Game Setting," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(3), pages 339-352, September.
    6. Coates, Dennis, 1993. "Property tax competition in a repeated game," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 111-119, March.
    7. Marco Cotenaro & Jean-Pierre Vidal, 2006. "Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 72(1), pages 5-18.
    8. Catenaro, Marco & Vidal, Jean-Pierre, 2003. "Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions," Working Paper Series 259, European Central Bank.
    9. Egger, Peter & Koethenbuerger, Marko & Smart, Michael, 2010. "Do fiscal transfers alleviate business tax competition? Evidence from Germany," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3-4), pages 235-246, April.
    10. Itaya, Jun-ichi & Okamura, Makoto & Yamaguchi, Chikara, 2008. "Are regional asymmetries detrimental to tax coordination in a repeated game setting?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2403-2411, December.
    11. Marco CATENARO & Jean-Pierre VIDAL, 2006. "Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2006011, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    12. Carl Gaigné & Stéphane Riou, 2007. "Globalization, Asymmetric Tax Competition, and Fiscal Equalization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(5), pages 901-925, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:kap:itaxpf:v:25:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10797-017-9451-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Hikaru Ogawa & Atsushi Yamagishi, 2016. "Ad Valorem Capital Tax Competition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1030, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    3. Satoshi Kasamatsu & Hikaru Ogawa, 2017. "International Capital Market and Repeated Tax Competition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1071, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    4. repec:eee:reveco:v:51:y:2017:i:c:p:431-443 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Ogawa, Hikaru & Wang, Wenming, 2016. "Asymmetric tax competition and fiscal equalization in a repeated game setting," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-10.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax competition; fiscal transfer scheme; repeated game; tax cooperation;

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(201412)70:4_556:ftiarm_2.0.tx_2-p. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert). General contact details of provider: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/fa .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.