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Two-Sided Search and Temporary Employment

Author

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  • Paolini, Dimitri

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to model explicitly the possibility to form temporary matching in a model of two-sided search. The agents (workers and employers) differ by their human quality endowment. In a search equilibrium agents form subintervals and are only matched to agents within their class. The introduction of a temporary market can have a positive impact on unemployment, but it may have a negative impact on low-skilled agents' utility. When a delay cost is introduced, this negative impact can be reduced especially if an education policy is implemented to decrease the heterogeneity of the human capital.

Suggested Citation

  • Paolini, Dimitri, 2000. "Two-Sided Search and Temporary Employment," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2000011, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2000011
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    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2000-11.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1996. "Are the unemployed unemployable?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(7), pages 1501-1519, August.
    2. Cahuc, Pierre & Postel-Vinay, Fabien, 2002. "Temporary jobs, employment protection and labor market performance," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, February.
    3. Bentolila, Samuel & Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1992. "The macroeconomic impact of flexible labor contracts, with an application to Spain," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1013-1047, June.
    4. Bloch, Francis & Ryder, Harl, 2000. "Two-Sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 93-115, February.
    5. Wasmer, Etienne, 1999. "Competition for Jobs in a Growing Economy and the Emergence of Dualism," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(457), pages 349-371, July.
    6. Ken Burdett & Melvyn G. Coles, 1997. "Marriage and Class," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 141-168.
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    Cited by:

    1. D. Paolini, 2008. "Screening and short-term contracts," Working Paper CRENoS 200819, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Two-Sided Search; Matching; Temporary Employment;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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