IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cte/werepe/34383.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Competitive search with two-sided risk aversion

Author

Listed:
  • Jerez, Belén

Abstract

We analyze a static competitive search model where risk-averse individuals with different wealth levels trade an indivisible good. The real estate market is a particularly relevant application. We show that the equilibrium is constrained efficient. Other properties of the equilibrium are derived, including the generalized version of the Hosios (1990) rule for this environment. Under risk aversion, buyers and sellers evaluate the trade-off between prices and trading probabilities differently as their wealth increases. As they become richer, buyers are relatively less concerned about paying higher prices and more concerned about increasing their trading probability. Conversely, richer sellers care less about increasing the probability of a sale than poorer sellers, and they care more about trading at a higher price. This results in positive sorting inequilibrium, that is, wealthier (poorer) buyers and sellers trading with each other. As transactions among wealthier agents involve higher prices, the equilibrium features frictional price dispersion. By contrast, with transferable utility, all individuals would trade at the same price, irrespectively of their wealth.

Suggested Citation

  • Jerez, Belén, 2022. "Competitive search with two-sided risk aversion," UC3M Working papers. Economics 34383, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:34383
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams/005b9a37-2d53-4300-b2ce-7e4ada37badf/content
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mayock, Tom & Malacrida, Rachel Spritzer, 2018. "Socioeconomic and racial disparities in the financial returns to homeownership," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 80-96.
    2. Menzio, Guido & Shi, Shouyong, 2010. "Block recursive equilibria for stochastic models of search on the job," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(4), pages 1453-1494, July.
    3. Jan Eeckhout & Alireza Sepahsalari, 2024. "The Effect of Wealth on Worker Productivity," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(3), pages 1584-1633.
    4. Acemoglu, Daron & Shimer, Robert, 1999. "Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 827-849, November.
    5. Jerez, Belén, 2014. "Competitive equilibrium with search frictions: A general equilibrium approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 252-286.
    6. Shouyong Shi, 2009. "Directed Search for Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 561-584, March.
    7. Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, 1999. "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 893-928, October.
    8. Antonia Díaz & Belén Jerez & Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero, 2024. "Housing Prices and Credit Constraints in Competitive Search," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(657), pages 220-270.
    9. Jerez, Belén, 2017. "Competitive search equilibrium with multidimensional heterogeneity and two-sided ex-ante investments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 202-219.
    10. Michael Peters, 1997. "On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The Case of Complete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(2), pages 241-264.
    11. Jan Eeckhout & Philipp Kircher, 2010. "Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 539-574, March.
    12. Merlo, Antonio & Ortalo-Magne, Francois, 2004. "Bargaining over residential real estate: evidence from England," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 192-216, September.
    13. Darren K. Hayunga & Henry J. Munneke, 2021. "Examining Both Sides of the Transaction: Bargaining in the Housing Market," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 49(2), pages 663-691, June.
    14. Elder, Harold W & Zumpano, Leonard V & Baryla, Edward A, 1999. "Buyer Search Intensity and the Role of the Residential Real Estate Broker," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 351-368, May.
    15. Moen, Espen R, 1997. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
    16. Edward A. Baryla, Jr. & Leonard V. Zumpano & Harold W. Elder, 2000. "An Investigation of Buyer Search in the Residential Real Estate Market under Different Market Conditions," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 20(1), pages 75-91.
    17. Pietro Garibaldi & Espen R. Moen, 2010. "Job to Job Movements in a Simple Search Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 343-347, May.
    18. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1975. "A model of equilibrium with differentiated commodities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 263-295.
    19. Norman G. Miller, 1978. "Time on the Market and Selling Price," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 6(2), pages 164-174, June.
    20. Delacroix, Alain & Shi, Shouyong, 2013. "Pricing and signaling with frictions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1301-1332.
    21. Carlos Garriga & Aaron Hedlund, 2020. "Mortgage Debt, Consumption, and Illiquid Housing Markets in the Great Recession," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(6), pages 1603-1634, June.
    22. Hedlund, Aaron, 2016. "Illiquidity and its discontents: Trading delays and foreclosures in the housing market," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 1-13.
    23. Shi, Shouyong, 2001. "Frictional Assignment. I. Efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 232-260, June.
    24. Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298.
    25. Robert R. Trippi, 1977. "Estimating the Relationship between Price and Time to Sale for Investment Property," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 23(8), pages 838-842, April.
    26. Randall Wright & Philipp Kircher & Benoît Julien & Veronica Guerrieri, 2021. "Directed Search and Competitive Search Equilibrium: A Guided Tour," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 90-148, March.
    27. Jerez, Belén, 2017. "Online appendix : Competitive Search Equilibrium with Multidimensional Heterogeneity and Two-Sided Ex-ante Investments," UC3M Working papers. Economics 25364, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Antonia Díaz & Belén Jerez & Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero, 2024. "Housing Prices and Credit Constraints in Competitive Search," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(657), pages 220-270.
    2. Kircher, Philipp & Wright, Randall & Julien, Benoit & Guerrieri, Veronica, 2017. "Directed Search: A Guided Tour," CEPR Discussion Papers 12315, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Jerez, Belén, 2014. "Competitive equilibrium with search frictions: A general equilibrium approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 252-286.
    4. Jerez, Belén, 2017. "Competitive search equilibrium with multidimensional heterogeneity and two-sided ex-ante investments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 202-219.
    5. Gabrovski, Miroslav & Kospentaris, Ioannis, 2021. "Intermediation in over-the-counter markets with price transparency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    6. Rabinovich, Stanislav & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2022. "Misallocation inefficiency in partially directed search," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    7. Leo Kaas & Philipp Kircher, 2015. "Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(10), pages 3030-3060, October.
    8. Davoodalhosseini, Seyed Mohammadreza, 2019. "Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 568-593.
    9. Kawata, Keisuke & Nakajima, Kentaro & Sato, Yasuhiro, 2016. "Multi-region job search with moving costs," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 114-129.
    10. Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter A. & Wolthoff, Ronald P., 2017. "Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 453-473.
    11. Mangin, Sephorah, 2017. "A theory of production, matching, and distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 376-409.
    12. Philipp Kircher, 2009. "Efficiency of Simultaneous Search," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(5), pages 861-913, October.
    13. Manolis Galenianos & Philipp Kircher, 2012. "On The Game‐Theoretic Foundations Of Competitive Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(1), pages 1-21, February.
    14. Jan Eeckhout & Philipp Kircher, 2010. "Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 539-574, March.
    15. Head, Allen & Sun, Hongfei & Zhou, Chenggang, 2023. "Indebted sellers, liquidity and mortgage standards," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    16. Han, Lu & Strange, William C., 2015. "The Microstructure of Housing Markets," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 813-886, Elsevier.
    17. Shi, Shouyong, 2023. "Sequentially mixed search and equilibrium price dispersion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    18. Menzio, Guido & Shi, Shouyong & Sun, Hongfei, 2013. "A monetary theory with non-degenerate distributions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2266-2312.
    19. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2017. "Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(604), pages 2041-2065, September.
    20. Michèle Belot & Philipp Kircher & Paul Muller, 2022. "How Wage Announcements Affect Job Search—A Field Experiment," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 1-67, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sorting;

    JEL classification:

    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:34383. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ana Poveda (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.eco.uc3m.es/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.