Shareholders' agreements and voting power. Evidence from Italian listed firms
This work provides an empirical investigation of shareholders’ agreements signed in Italy over the last decade. The focus is on the impact of agreements on the voting power (Shapley value) of participants. The evidence shows that agreements produce a remarkable reshuffling of voting power. Two views are confronted. First: agreements allow the largest shareholder to increase his power beyond his own voting rights, exploiting a leverage effect. Second: agreements are a way to share control among a coalition of large shareholders, thus limiting the ability of the first one to extract private benefits of control. The leverage effect seems to prevail at lower levels of ownership concentration, while the shared control view works better at higher levels of ownership concentration. Supermajority rules – a tool to reach a more balanced distribution of power – are more likely to be adopted when the first owner has a larger equity stake.
|Length:||nn pages 21|
|Date of creation:||May 2008|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/EconomiaFinanza|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Maury, Benjamin & Pajuste, Anete, 2005. "Multiple large shareholders and firm value," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 1813-1834, July.
- Bloch, Francis & Hege, Ulrich, 2003. "Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests," MPRA Paper 42286, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986.
"Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Scholarly Articles 3606237, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Volpin, Paolo F., 2002. "Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 61-90, April.
- Volpin, Paolo, 2002. "Governance with Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in Italy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3229, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 1997. "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 693-728.
- Nicodano, Giovanna, 1998. "Corporate groups, dual-class shares and the value of voting rights," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(9), pages 1117-1137, September.
- MacKinnon, James G. & White, Halbert, 1985. "Some heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimators with improved finite sample properties," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 305-325, September.
- James G. MacKinnon & Halbert White, 1983. "Some Heteroskedasticity Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimators with Improved Finite Sample Properties," Working Papers 537, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
- Zingales, Luigi, 1994. "The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 125-148.
- Nenova, Tatiana, 2003. "The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 325-351, June.
- Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, 2008. "Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(2), pages 579-604, April.
- Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, 2006. "Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations," NBER Working Papers 12675, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, 2007. "Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations," IMF Working Papers 07/140, International Monetary Fund.
- Larry H. P. Lang & Mara Faccio & Leslie Young, 2001. "Dividends and Expropriation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 54-78, March.
- Marco Pagano & Ailsa Röell, 1998. "The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(1), pages 187-225.
- Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Computation of Power Indices," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 644, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Dennis Leech, 2001. "Shareholder Voting Power and Corporate Governance: A Study of Large British Companies," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 27, pages 33-54.
- Paolo, Santella & Carlo, Drago & Giulia, Paone, 2007. "Who cares about Director Independence?," MPRA Paper 2288, University Library of Munich, Germany. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)