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Shareholders' agreements and voting power: evidence from Italian listed firms

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  • Angelo Baglioni

Abstract

This work provides an empirical investigation of shareholders' agreements signed in Italy over the past decade. The evidence shows that agreements produce a remarkable reshuffling of voting power (Shapley value) among participants. In particular, the first owner gains much voting power at low levels of ownership concentration, and his gain is decreasing in his ownership stake; the opposite happens for the other participants. In addition, the likelihood that a supermajority rule is included in an agreement contract is increasing in the first owner's share of equity. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that agreements are used to correct situations where the first owner's power is at one of the two extremes: either too low (leading to insufficient monitoring over managers and gridlocks in decision-making) or too high (enabling him to extract large private benefits of control).

Suggested Citation

  • Angelo Baglioni, 2011. "Shareholders' agreements and voting power: evidence from Italian listed firms," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(27), pages 4043-4052.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:43:y:2011:i:27:p:4043-4052
    DOI: 10.1080/00036841003781494
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Jaskiewicz & François Belot & James G. Combs & Emmanuel Boutron & Céline Barrédy, 2024. "When Do Shareholder Agreements Add Value? Mitigating Superprincipal-Agency Conflicts in Family Firms," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 48(6), pages 1451-1494, November.
    2. Lubov Borisovna Sitdikova & Svetlana Jurievna Starodumova, 2019. "Corporate agreement as a means of providing security in the course of entrepreneurship development," Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues, VsI Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Center, vol. 7(1), pages 324-335, September.
    3. Giuseppe Mastromatteo, 2011. "The Debate on the Crisis: Recent Reappraisals of the Concept of Functional Finance," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0105, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    4. Binz Astrachan, Claudia & Astrachan, Joseph H. & Kotlar, Josip & Michiels, Anneleen, 2021. "Addressing the theory-practice divide in family business research: The case of shareholder agreements," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 12(1).
    5. Sandro Brusco & Luca Colombo & Umberto Galmarini, 2010. "Local Governments Tax Autonomy, Lobbying, and Welfare," Department of Economics Working Papers 10-01, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    6. Vicente Lima Crisóstomo & Priscila Azevedo Prudêncio & Isac Freitas Brandão, 2023. "Corporate Reputation in Brazil: The Effects of the Shareholding Control Configuration, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Social Responsibility," Corporate Reputation Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 26(4), pages 243-263, November.
    7. Andre Leonardo Pruner da Silva & Jeferson Lana & Rosilene Marcon, 2018. "Agreeing and Impacting: The Effect of the Shareholders' Agreement on Firms' Market Value," Brazilian Business Review, Fucape Business School, vol. 15(1), pages 88-104, January.
    8. Giuseppe Mastromatteo, 2011. "H.P. Minsky And Policies To Countervail Crises," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0102, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).

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    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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