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Undeclared Labour in Unionized Oligopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Minas Vlassis

    (Department of Economics, University of Crete, Greece)

  • Stefanos Mamakis

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Minas Vlassis & Stefanos Mamakis, 2014. "Undeclared Labour in Unionized Oligopoly," Working Papers 1405, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:crt:wpaper:1405
    as

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    File URL: http://economics.soc.uoc.gr/wpa/docs/1405.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Petrakis, Emmanuel & Vlassis, Minas, 2000. "Endogenous scope of bargaining in a union-oligopoly model: when will firms and unions bargain over employment?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 261-281, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • E26 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Informal Economy; Underground Economy
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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