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Coordinating Flood Insurance and Collective Prevention Policies: A Fiscal Federalism Perspective

Author Info

  • Céline Grislain-Letrémy

    ()

    (CREST)

  • Sabine Lemoyne de Forges

    ()

    (Ecole Polytechnique)

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    Abstract

    No abstract is available for this item.

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    File URL: http://www.crest.fr/images/doctravail/2011-07.pdf
    File Function: Crest working paper version
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    Paper provided by Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique in its series Working Papers with number 2011-07.

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    Length: 30
    Date of creation: Feb 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2011-07
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    Keywords: insurance; fiscal federalism; externalities; prevention; flood;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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    1. Gilbert, Guy & Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Incentives and optimal size of local jurisdictions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 19-41, January.
    2. Carolyn Kousky & Erzo Luttmer & Richard Zeckhauser, 2006. "Private investment and government protection," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 73-100, September.
    3. Ulph, Alistair, 2000. "Harmonization and Optimal Environmental Policy in a Federal System with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 224-241, March.
    4. Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
    5. Pierre Picard, 2005. "Natural disaster insurance and the equity-efficiency trade-off," Working Papers hal-00243028, HAL.
    6. Picard Pierre & Gilbert G, 1991. "Incentives and the optimal size of local territories," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9124, CEPREMAP.
    7. Susan K. Laury & Melayne Morgan McInnes, 2003. "The Impact of Insurance Prices on Decision Making Biases: An Experimental Analysis," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 70(2), pages 219-233.
    8. Laure Latruffe & Pierre Picard, 2005. "Assurance des catastrophes naturelles : faut-il choisir entre prévention et solidarité ?," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 78, pages 33-56.
    9. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
    10. Alexander Muermann & Howard Kunreuther, 2008. "Self-protection and insurance with interdependencies," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 103-123, April.
    11. Silva, Emilson C. D., 1997. "Decentralized and Efficient Control of Transboundary Pollution in Federal Systems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 95-108, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Céline Grislain-Letrémy & Bertrand Villeneuve, 2011. "Natural and Industrial Disasters : Land Use and Insurance," Working Papers 2011-32, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
    2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7845 is not listed on IDEAS

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