Centralized or decentralized? A case study of Norwegian hospital reform
In recent years, decentralization of financial and political power has been perceived as a useful means to improve outcomes of the health care sector of many European countries. Such reforms could be the result of fashionable policy trends, rather than being based on knowledge of "what works". If decentralization is the favored strategy in health care, studies of countries that go against the current trend will be of interest and importance as they provide information about the potential drawbacks of decentralization. In Norway, specialized health care has recently been recentralized. In this paper, we review some of the evidence now available on the economic effects of recentralization. Although recentralization has been associated with improvements in both cost efficiency and technical efficiency this may have been caused by the increasing role of activity-based funding methods used in the allocation of health care resources. However, recentralization was also associated with an increase in the rate of growth of real resources and the proportion of total costs being met by supplementary funding. As a result, recentralization failed to address the issues of cost containment and reductions in budget deficits.
Volume (Year): 64 (2007)
Issue (Month): 10 (May)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/315/description#description|
|Order Information:|| Postal: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/supportfaq.cws_home/regional|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Janos Kornai & Eric Maskin & Gerard Roland, 2002.
"Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint,"
Economics Working Papers
0019, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- J�nos Kornai & Eric Maskin & G�rard Roland, 2003. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1095-1136, December.
- J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland., 2004. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 11.
- J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland., 2004. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 12.
- Biorn, Erik & Hagen, Terje P. & Iversen, Tor & Magnussen, Jon, 2002.
"The Effect of Activity-Based Financing on Hospital Efficiency: A Panel Data Analysis of DEA Efficiency Scores 1992-2000,"
8099, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Biørn, Erik & Hagen, Terje P. & Iversen, Tor & Magnussen, Jon, 2009. "The effect of activity-based financing on hospital efficiency: A panel data analysis of DEA efficiency scores 1992-2000," HERO On line Working Paper Series 2002:8, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme.
- Picard Pierre & Gilbert G, 1991.
"Incentives and the optimal size of local territories,"
CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange)
- Picard, P. & Gilbert, G., 1992. "Incentives and the Optimal Size of Local Territories," Research Papers by the Institute of Economics and Econometrics, Geneva School of Economics and Management, University of Geneva 92.12, Institut d'Economie et Econométrie, Université de Genève.
- Hagen, Terje P. & Kaarboe, Oddvar M., 2006. "The Norwegian hospital reform of 2002: Central government takes over ownership of public hospitals," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 320-333, May.
- Gilbert, Guy & Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Incentives and optimal size of local jurisdictions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 19-41, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:socmed:v:64:y:2007:i:10:p:2129-2137. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.