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Assurance chômage et sociétés

Dans ce texte, nous nous penchons sur la question du chômage et de sa provenance. Notre réflexion nous amène à considérer le chômage essentiellement comme l'effet de l'adaptation de comportements individuels à une série de règles sociales. Une assurance chômage peut s'avérer utile, encore faut-il qu'elle soit choisie en tenant compte des effets dissuasifs qu'elle aura sur l'emploi. Nous faisons état d'une série d'outils de plus en plus raffinés pour déterminer une assurance chômage optimale, étant entendu que celle-ci variera d'une société à l'autre. In this paper, we make an attempt at understanding unemployment and some of its many origins. Our inquiry leads us to view unemployment essentially as a perverse effect of social rules on individual behaviors. An unemployment insurance program may be socially desirable, yet its optimal level of generosity ought to be incentive compatible. We provide a series of tools, which may be used to determine the optimal unemployment insurance package of various societies.

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Paper provided by Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques in its series Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM with number 9904.

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Length: 17
Date of creation: Apr 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in: Finances publiques, Finances privées, Bernard Jurion et Pierre Pestieau (éds.), Éditions de l'Université de Liège, 123-141, 2000.
Handle: RePEc:cre:uqamwp:9904
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  1. Stephane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 1998. "Voting on Unemployment Insurance Generosity," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 64, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
  2. Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, 1994. "The computational experiment: an econometric tool," Working Paper 9420, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  3. Lars Ljungqvist & Thomas J. Sargent, 1995. "The European unemployment dilemma," Working Paper Series, Macroeconomic Issues 95-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
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  6. Carl Davidson & Stephen A. Woodbury, . "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles cdsaw1997, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
  7. James Costain, 1997. "Unemployment insurance with endogenous search intensity and precautionary saving," Economics Working Papers 243, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  8. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 1988. " Job Security, Work Incentives and Unemployment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 90(4), pages 453-74.
  9. Cremer, Helmuth & Marchand, Maurice & Pestieau, Pierre, 1995. "The optimal level of unemployment insurance benefits in a model of employment mismatch," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 407-420, December.
  10. Bruce D. Meyer, 1995. "Lessons from the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 91-131, March.
  11. Richard Rogerson, 1997. "Theory Ahead of Language in the Economics of Unemployment," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 73-92, Winter.
  12. Stephen Nickell, 1997. "Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North America," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 55-74, Summer.
  13. Hassler, John & Rodriguez Mora, Jose V., 1999. "Employment turnover and the public allocation of unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 55-83, July.
  14. Hopenhayn, H. & Nicolini, P.J., 1996. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," RCER Working Papers 421, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  15. Meyer, Bruce D, 1990. "Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 757-82, July.
  16. Marceau, Nicolas & Boadway, Robin, 1994. " Minimum Wage Legislation and Unemployment Insurance as Instruments for Redistribution," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(1), pages 67-81.
  17. Jacob Mincer, 1991. "Education and Unemployment," NBER Working Papers 3838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Wang, C. & Williamson, S., 1995. "Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy," GSIA Working Papers 1995-13, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  19. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J., 1987. "Union activity, unemployment persistence and wage-employment ratchets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 157-167.
  20. Wright, Randall, 1986. "The redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 377-399, December.
  21. Gary D. Hansen & Ayse Imrohoroglu, 1990. "The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard," UCLA Economics Working Papers 583, UCLA Department of Economics.
  22. Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen D., 2002. "Moral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance, and experience rating," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1337-1371, October.
  23. Baily, Martin Neil, 1978. "Some aspects of optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 379-402, December.
  24. Zhang, G-J, 1996. "Unemployment Insurance Analysis in a Search Economy," Working Papers 1996-2, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  25. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1978. "Unemployment Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 353-57, May.
  26. Steven Shavell & Laurence Weiss, 1978. "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 503, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  27. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1982. "Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1345-70, November.
  28. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November.
  29. Dellas, Harris, 1997. "Unemployment insurance benefits and human capital accumulation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 517-524, April.
  30. Andolfatto, David & Gomme, Paul, 1996. "Unemployment insurance and labor-market activity in Canada," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 47-82, June.
  31. Weiss, Andrew W, 1980. "Job Queues and Layoffs in Labor Markets with Flexible Wages," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 526-38, June.
  32. Nickell, S J, 1979. "The Effect of Unemployment and Related Benefits on the Duration of Unemployment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(353), pages 34-49, March.
  33. Pallage, Stephane & Zimmermann, Christian, 2001. "Voting on Unemployment Insurance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(4), pages 903-23, November.
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