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Assurance chômage et sociétés

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Abstract

Dans ce texte, nous nous penchons sur la question du chômage et de sa provenance. Notre réflexion nous amène à considérer le chômage essentiellement comme l'effet de l'adaptation de comportements individuels à une série de règles sociales. Une assurance chômage peut s'avérer utile, encore faut-il qu'elle soit choisie en tenant compte des effets dissuasifs qu'elle aura sur l'emploi. Nous faisons état d'une série d'outils de plus en plus raffinés pour déterminer une assurance chômage optimale, étant entendu que celle-ci variera d'une société à l'autre. In this paper, we make an attempt at understanding unemployment and some of its many origins. Our inquiry leads us to view unemployment essentially as a perverse effect of social rules on individual behaviors. An unemployment insurance program may be socially desirable, yet its optimal level of generosity ought to be incentive compatible. We provide a series of tools, which may be used to determine the optimal unemployment insurance package of various societies.

Suggested Citation

  • Stéphane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 1999. "Assurance chômage et sociétés," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9904, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
  • Handle: RePEc:cre:uqamwp:9904
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unemployment; unemployment insurance; moral hazard; voting;

    JEL classification:

    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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