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The optimal level of unemployment insurance benefits in a model of employment mismatch

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  • CREMER, H.
  • MARCHAND, M.
  • PESTIEAU, P.

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  • Cremer, H. & Marchand, M. & Pestieau, P., 1996. "The optimal level of unemployment insurance benefits in a model of employment mismatch," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1200, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1200
    DOI: 10.1016/0927-5371(95)80043-W
    Note: In : Labour Economics, 2, 407-420, 1996
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baily, Martin Neil, 1978. "Some aspects of optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 379-402, December.
    2. Flemming, J. S., 1978. "Aspects of optimal unemployment insurance : Search, leisure, savings and capital market imperfections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 403-425, December.
    3. Topel, Robert & Welch, Finis, 1980. "Unemployment Insurance: Survey and Extensions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 47(187), pages 351-379, August.
    4. Burdett, Kenneth, 1979. "Unemployment Insurance Payments as a Search Subsidy: A Theoretical Analysis," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 17(3), pages 333-343, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Luz Adriana Flórez, 2014. "The Efficiency of the Informal Sector on the Search and Matching Framework," Borradores de Economia 11954, Banco de la Republica.
    2. Vodopivec, Milan & Raju, Dhushyanth, 2002. "Income support systems for the unemployed : issues and options," Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 25529, The World Bank.
    3. Tomer Blumkin & Leif Danziger & Eran Yashiv, 2017. "Optimal unemployment benefit policy and the firm productivity distribution," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(1), pages 36-59, February.
    4. Stéphane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 1999. "Assurance chômage et sociétés," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9904, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
    5. Milan Vodopivec, 2004. "Income Support for the Unemployed : Issues and Options," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 14922, December.
    6. Guillaume Wilemme, 2021. "Optimal Taxation to Correct Job Mismatching," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 40, pages 170-197, April.
    7. Cahuc, Pierre & Lehmann, Etienne, 2000. "Should unemployment benefits decrease with the unemployment spell?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 135-153, July.
    8. Alon Binyamini & Tali Larom, 2012. "Encouraging Participation in a Labor Market with Search and Matching Frictions," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2012.11, Bank of Israel.

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