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Fiscal Shocks and Fiscal Risk Management




We use the returns on a set of international financial securities to identify exogenous shocks to the Canadian federal surplus. We find that a large portion of the variation in the surplus can be replicated by a linear combination of these returns and that the rising debt observed in the 1980s and 1990s was a result of adverse exogenous shocks and a delayed response by the government to these shocks. We develop a formal framework to evaluate the potential gains from a fiscal risk management strategy, using these securities to hedge against exogenous shocks. We show that fiscal risk management can generate significant welfare gains by enhancing the sustainability of fiscal policy and thereby lowering average tax rates. Nous utilisons les rendements de plusieurs actifs financiers internationaux pour identifier les chocs exogènes au surplus fédéral canadien. Nous trouvons qu'une grande proportion de la variation du surplus peut être répliquée par une combinaison linéaire de ces rendements et que la dette croissante observée durant les années 1980 et 1990 était le résultat de chocs exogènes négatifs et d'une réponse retardée du gouvernement face à ces chocs. Nous développons un cadre formel permettant d'évaluer les gains potentiels provenant d'une stratégie de gestion du risque fiscal utilisant ces actifs pour se couvrir contre des chocs exogènes. Nous montrons que la gestion du risque fiscal peut générer des gains en bien-être significatifs en améliorant la soutenabilité de la politique fiscale et ainsi en réduisant les taux d'imposition moyens.

Suggested Citation

  • Huw Lloyd-Ellis & Xiaodong Zhu, 2000. "Fiscal Shocks and Fiscal Risk Management," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 108, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
  • Handle: RePEc:cre:crefwp:108

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    Cited by:

    1. Melecky, Martin, 2012. "Formulation of public debt management strategies: An empirical study of possible drivers," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 218-234.
    2. Marcet, Albert & Scott, Andrew, 2009. "Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 473-501, March.
    3. Felipe Santos Tostes & Helder Ferreira De Mendonça, 2016. "Credibility On Pass-Through In Brazil," Anais do XLII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 42ndd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 022, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    4. Feldstein, Martin, 2001. "Economic Problems of Ireland in Europe - incorporating 2 other Papers The Cost and Distribution of Tax Expenditure on Occupational Pensions in Ireland by G Hughes and The National Pensions Reserve Fun," Research Series, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), number GLS31.
    5. Christos Shiamptanis, 2015. "Risk Assessment Under A Nonlinear Fiscal Policy Rule," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(3), pages 1539-1555, July.
    6. Lloyd-Ellis, Huw & Zhan, Shiqiang & Zhu, Xiaodong, 2005. "Tax Smoothing with Stochastic Interest Rates: A Reassessment of Clinton's Fiscal Legacy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 699-724, August.
    7. P. R. Lane, 2001. "The National Pensions Reserve Fund: Pitfalls and Opportunities," Trinity Economics Papers 20017, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
    8. Adugna Olani, 2016. "Dynamic Capital inflow transmission of monetary policy to emerging markets," Working Papers 1358, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    9. Helder Mendonça & Felipe Tostes, 2015. "The Effect of Monetary and Fiscal Credibility on Exchange Rate Pass-Through in an Emerging Economy," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 787-816, September.
    10. repec:wlu:lcerpa:wm0070 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Huw Lloyd-Ellis & Xiaodong Zhu, 2004. "Using Financial Market Information to Enhance Canadian Fiscal Policy," Working Papers 1041, Queen's University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item


    Fiscal policy; sustainability; asset pricing; risk management;

    JEL classification:

    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt

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