The impact of the number of courts on the demand for trials
The recent reforms of the "judicial map" in Europe have drastically reduced the number of courts, raising fears of a decline in access to justice. This paper addresses this issue through a litigation model within a Salop (1979) model. We assume that victims of accidents differ both in terms of compensatory damages expected and in terms of distance from court. Due to distance costs, it might be too expensive to file cases for some victims with low expected awards. Therefore, the demand for trials is reduced by a decrease in the number of courts when the probability of an accident is exogenous. However, the link between the number of courts and the demand for trials is not clear cut when the probability of an accident occurring is determined by the defendant through his level of care. Furthermore, we determine the optimal number of courts.
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- Brekke, Kurt R. & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2008.
"Competition and waiting times in hospital markets,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1607-1628, July.
- Kurt R. Brekke & Luigi Siciliani & Odd Rune Straume, 2007. "Competition and Waiting Times in Hospital Markets," NIPE Working Papers 9/2007, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
- Brekke, Kurt Richard & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2007. "Competition and Waiting Times in Hospital Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 6285, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kurt R. Brekke & Luigi Siciliani & Odd Rune Straume, 2007. "Competition and Waiting Times in Hospital Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 2124, CESifo Group Munich.
- Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1988. "The deterrent effects of settlements and trials," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 109-116, June.
- Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
- Gravelle, H. S. E., 1990. "Rationing trials by waiting: Welfare implications," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 255-270, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)