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Privatisation in Poland: What Was the Government Trying to Achieve?

  • De Fraja, Gianni
  • Roberts, Barbara M

This paper uses the sequencing of privatisation to infer the objective pursued by the Polish government in the privatisation of its large manufacturing firms in the second half of the 1990's. We construct a model of mixed oligopoly, and use it to evaluate the privatisation process; our analysis is based on the assumption that firms which furthered the government's objective function the most would be chosen to be privatised first. Our empirical analysis identifies the features of the firms that were chosen for early privatisation, and suggests that the welfare maximisation was more important than the desire to maximise the revenues from privatisation and the government's budget, or to minimise employment losses.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6114.

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Date of creation: Feb 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6114
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  1. Roland, Gerard, 1994. "On the Speed and Sequencing of Privatisation and Restructuring," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(426), pages 1158-68, September.
  2. Nandini Gupta & John C. Ham & Jan Svejnar, 2000. "Priorities and Sequencing in Privatization: Theory and Evidence from the Czech Republic," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 323, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  3. Jan Svejnar, 2002. "Transition Economies: Performance and Challenges," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 3-28, Winter.
  4. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1989. "Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 302-11, April.
  5. Katz Barbara G. & Owen Joel, 1993. "Privatization: Choosing the Optimal Time Path," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 715-736, December.
  6. repec:pal:imfstp:v:39:y:1992:i:4:p:801-824 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. J. David Brown & John Earle & Almos Telegdy, 2005. "The Productivity Effects of Privatization: Longitudinal Estimates from Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine," CERT Discussion Papers 0508, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
  8. Jeffry M. Netter & William L. Megginson, 2001. "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 321-389, June.
  9. Aasim M. Husain & Ratna Sahay, 1992. "Does Sequencing of Privatization Matter in Reforming Planned Economies?," IMF Working Papers 92/13, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Glaeser, Edward L. & Scheinkman, Jose A., 1996. "The Transition to Free Markets: Where to Begin Privatization," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 23-42, February.
  11. Cremer, H. & Marchand, M. & Thisse, J.-F., 1987. "The public firm as an instrument for regulating an oligopolistic market," CORE Discussion Papers 1987010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. Roman Frydman & Cheryl Gray & Marek Hessel & Andrzej Rapaczynski, 1999. "When Does Privatization Work? The Impact of Private Ownership on Corporate Performance in the Transition Economies," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1153-1191.
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