Ex Ante Effects of Ex Post Managerial Ownership
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More about this item
Keywordsmanagement buy-outs; managers incentives; privatizations;
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- P34 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Finance
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-10-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2006-10-28 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-FIN-2006-10-28 (Finance)
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