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Caveat Emptor: Coping With Sovereign Risk Without the Multilaterals

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  • Flandreau, Marc

Abstract

This paper studies how private banks dealt with sovereign risk before World War I. At that time there was no multilateral institution to bail out borrowers in default and sovereign rating had not yet developed. All the burden of information collection and processing was borne out by individual banks. We focus on the experience of Crédit Lyonnais, which grew over the period into the largest international bank in a country that was the second largest world creditor. In 1871, Crédit Lyonnais set up a Service d'Etudes Financières (SEF), a research department whose aim was to study borrowing countries. The lending spree of the late 1880s, and the bust which ensued, provided the impetus for a massive expansion of SEF, which then developed techniques to analyse sovereign risks. We argue that these methods are an essential aspect of the market mechanism as it operated before World War I: given the prominence of Crédit Lyonnais on the international scene, its perceptions influenced the size and direction of capital flows.

Suggested Citation

  • Flandreau, Marc, 1998. "Caveat Emptor: Coping With Sovereign Risk Without the Multilaterals," CEPR Discussion Papers 2004, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/645 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Marc Flandreau & Jacques Le Cacheux & Frédéric Zumer, 1998. "Stability without a pact? Lessons from the European gold standard, 1880—1914," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 116-162.
    3. Marc Flandreau, 1997. "Central Bank Cooperation in Historical Perspective: A Sceptical View," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 50(4), pages 735-763, November.
    4. Frédéric Zumer & Jacques Le Cacheux & Marc Flandreau, 1998. "Stability without a pact? Lessons from the European Gold Standard, 1880-1913," Working Papers hal-01037858, HAL.
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    6. Aggarwal,Vinod K., 1996. "Debt Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521555524.
    7. Ludger Schuknecht & Mr. Vito Tanzi, 1995. "The Growth of Government and the Reform of the State in Industrial Countries," IMF Working Papers 1995/130, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Aggarwal,Vinod K., 1996. "Debt Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521352024.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marc Flandreau & Nathan Sussman, 2004. "Old sins. Exchange Clauses and European Foreign Lending in the 19th Century," Working Papers hal-01065494, HAL.
    2. Flandreau, Marc & Zumer, Frederic & Accominotti, Olivier & Rezzik, Riad, 2008. "Black Man?s Burden: Measured Philanthropy in the British Empire, 1880-1913," CEPR Discussion Papers 6811, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/324 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/324 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/324 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Christodoulaki, Olga & Penzer, Jeremy, 2004. "News from London: Greek government bonds on the London Stock Exchange, 1914-1929," Economic History Working Papers 22335, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    private sector risk models; rating; Sovereign Risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative

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