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The axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from bundled pricing

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  • BERGANTINOS, Gustavo

    (Universidad de Vigo, Spain)

  • MORENO-TERNERO, Juan

    (Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Spain; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

We explore in this paper the axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from bundled pricing. We formalize two models for this problem on the grounds of two different informational bases. In both models, we provide axiomatic rationale for natural rules to solve the problem. We, nonetheless, obtain drastic differences under each scenario, which highlights the importance of setting the appropriate informational basis of the problem.

Suggested Citation

  • BERGANTINOS, Gustavo & MORENO-TERNERO, Juan, 2014. "The axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from bundled pricing," CORE Discussion Papers 2014027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2014027
    as

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    File URL: http://uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2014_27web.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Arantza Estévez-Fernández & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers, 2012. "A Note On Passepartout Problems," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(02), pages 1-9.
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    3. Ginsburgh, Victor & Zang, Israel, 2003. "The museum pass game and its value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 322-325, May.
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    5. M. Angeles de Frutos, 1999. "Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(3), pages 255-272.
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    7. William James Adams & Janet L. Yellen, 1976. "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(3), pages 475-498.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    resource allocation; bundled pricing; museum passes; proportional; axioms;

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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