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Intention-based economic theories of reciprocity


  • Darwin Cortes



Recientemente, varios experimentos han mostrado que los individuos exhiben un comportamiento auténticamente recíproco en interacciones anónimas que se dan una sola vez ('one-shot'). En tanto que se ha mostrado que la reciprocidad es relevante en múltiples campos de la economía, han existido varios intentos por modelar el comportamiento recíproco. Este documento revisa los modelos de reciprocidad que se fundamentan en las intenciones y presenta un ejemplo para el caso del manejo de los profesores en el sector público, en el que el gobierno ofrece un esquema de incentivos para la implementación de un programa. Este esquema tiene la estructura del dilema del prisionero. Tanto en los juegos simultáneos como secuenciales, los resultados de equilibrio puede ser distintos a los que predice la teoría convencional. ************************************************************************ In recent years, several experiments have shown that individuals exhibit authentic reciprocal behavior in anonymous one-shot interactions. As reciprocity has been shown to be relevant in several economic fields, there have also been several attempts to model reciprocical behavior. I review the intention-based models of reciprocity and present an example in teachers´ management in the public sector in which a government offers an incentive scheme to implement a program. The incentive scheme has the prisioner’s dilemma structure, In both simultaneous and sequential games, in equilibrium reciprocal teachers may reach other equilibria different from those predicted by the standard theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Darwin Cortes, 2002. "Intention-based economic theories of reciprocity," Borradores de Investigación 002904, Universidad del Rosario.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000091:002904

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
    2. George A. Akerlof, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-569.
    3. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520.
    4. David K. Levine, 1998. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 593-622, July.
    5. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity," Discussion Papers in Economics 14, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    6. Caroline Minter Hoxby, 1996. "How Teachers' Unions Affect Education Production," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(3), pages 671-718.
    7. Frey, Bruno S & Jegen, Reto, 2001. " Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
    8. Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March.
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    More about this item


    Game theory; psychological games; Intention-based models; reciprocl behaviour;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General


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