Intention - Based economic theories of reciprocity
In recent years, several experiments have shown individuals exhibit authentic reciprocal behaviour in anonymous one-shot interactions. As reciprocity has been shown to be relevant in several economic fields, there have also been several attempts to model reciprocal bahaviour. I review the intention-based models of reciprocity and present an example of teacher management in the public sector in which the government offers an incentive scheme to implement a program. The incentive scheme has a prisoner´s dilemma structure. In both simultaneous and sequential games, equilibrium results may differ from those predicted by standard theory.
Volume (Year): (2002)
Issue (Month): (December)
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