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Choques de precios y elecciones: el café y la democracia en Colombia

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  • Gabriel Angarita Tovar

Abstract

Este trabajo evalúa el efecto de cambios en los precios del café sobre la competencia política y desempeno de los diferentes partidos en Colombia. En el período 2002-2015, se encuentra que, ante incrementos en los precios del café, la competencia política en las elecciones disminuye de forma diferencial en los sitios más cafeteros. Una interpretación posible puntualiza que los cafeteros incidieron a través de inversiones en un mercado político, en un período de pérdida de poder político y económico (bajo poder de jure). En contraste, entre 1930-1946 se encuentra que los incrementos de los precios del café implicaron un aumento en la competencia política en los municipios más cafeteros. Una lectura de los resultados en este período, indica que los cafeteros contaban con instituciones favorables (alto pode de jure) y, por lo tanto, la mayor competencia se debe a que los partidos políticos disputaban por el acceso a los recursos del sector cafetero.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabriel Angarita Tovar, 2017. "Choques de precios y elecciones: el café y la democracia en Colombia," Documentos CEDE 15608, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000089:015608
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    café; choques de precios;

    JEL classification:

    • E30 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • Q33 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Resource Booms (Dutch Disease)
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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