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Banking Crises and the Rules of the Game

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  • Charles W. Calomiris

Abstract

This paper is aimed to address when and why do banking crises occur, and whether financial reforms in reaction to crises are generally beneficial. It is argued that banking crises properly defined consist either of panics or of waves of costly bank failures, and they do not necessarily coincide. Risk-inviting microeconomic rules of the banking game that are established by government are viewed as the key necessary condition to producing a propensity for banking distress, whether in the form of a high propensity for banking panics or a high propensity for waves of bank failures.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles W. Calomiris, 2009. "Banking Crises and the Rules of the Game," Working Papers 2009/14, Czech National Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:cnb:wpaper:2009/14
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    File URL: https://www.cnb.cz/export/sites/cnb/en/economic-research/.galleries/research_publications/cnb_wp/cnbwp_2009_14.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:aei:rpbook:53074 is not listed on IDEAS
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    4. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 2002. "Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1373-1406, October.
    5. Charles W. Calomiris & Eugene N. White, 1994. "The Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance," NBER Chapters, in: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, pages 145-188, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, 2000. "Reforming Bank Capital Regulation: A Proposal by the U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 920273, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra, 2014. "Wall Street, Capitol Hill, and K Street: Political Influence and Financial Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(4), pages 1063-1084.
    2. Akin, Ozlem & Marín, José María & Peydró, José-Luis, 2020. "Anticipating the financial crisis: Evidence from insider trading in banks," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 35(102), pages 213-267.
    3. Mark Carlson, 2015. "Lessons from the Historical Use of Reserve Requirements in the United States to Promote Bank Liquidity," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(1), pages 191-224, January.
    4. William A. Allen & Richhild Moessner, 2011. "The international propagation of the financial crisis of 2008 and a comparison with 1931," BIS Working Papers 348, Bank for International Settlements.
    5. Abdul Bahri, Elya Nabila & Mohd Nor, Abu Hassan Shaari & Sarmidi, Tamat & Haji Mohd Nor, Nor Hakimah, 2018. "Nonlinear Relationship between Financial Development and Economic Growth: Evidence from Post Global Financial Crisis Panel Data," Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, vol. 52(1), pages 15-30.
    6. Bindseil, Ulrich & Winkler, Adalbert, 2012. "Dual liquidity crises under alternative monetary frameworks: a financial accounts perspective," Working Paper Series 1478, European Central Bank.
    7. Petar Stankov, 2018. "Deregulation, Economic Growth and Growth Acceleration," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 43(4), pages 21-40, December.
    8. Fabio Schiantarelli & Massimiliano Stacchini & Philip E. Strahan, 2020. "Bank Quality, Judicial Efficiency, and Loan Repayment Delays in Italy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(4), pages 2139-2178, August.
    9. Mian, Atif & Sufi, Amir & Trebbi, Francesco, 2013. "The Political Economy of the Subprime Mortgage Credit Expansion," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 8(4), pages 373-408, October.
    10. Leszek Balcerowicz, 2014. "Euro Imbalances and Adjustment: A Comparative Analysis," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 34(3), pages 453-482, Fall.
    11. Pol, Eduardo, 2012. "The preponderant causes of the USA banking crisis 2007–08," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 519-528.
    12. Chu, Yongqiang & Zhang, Tim, 2022. "Political influence and banks: Evidence from mortgage lending," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    13. Fabio Schiantarelli & Massimiliano Stacchini & Philip E. Strahan, 2017. "Bank quality, judicial efficiency and borrower runs: loan repayment delays in Italy," IFC Bulletins chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Uses of central balance sheet data offices' information, volume 45, Bank for International Settlements.
    14. Winkler, Adalbert & Bindseil, Ulrich, 2012. "Dual liquidity crises under alternative monetary frameworks," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62032, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    15. Lengwiler, Yvan & Maringer, Dietmar, 2011. "Autonomously Interacting Banks," Working papers 2011/07, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    16. Chris Hunt, 2009. "Banking crises in New Zealand - an historical perspective," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 72, pages 26-41, December.
    17. Tanja Markovic-Hribernik & Matej Tomec, 2015. "Bad Bank And Other Possible Banks’ Rescuing Models – The Case Of Slovenia," Annals - Economy Series, Constantin Brancusi University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1, pages 128-141, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking; banking crises; financial reforms; microeconomic rules.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions

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