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Why Growth Rates Differ: The Political Economy of Social Capability in 21 Developing Countries

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  • Deepak Lal

    (UCLA)

Abstract

Social capability as a determinant of the differing growth performance of development countries over the last three decades is meant to cover all those causes of growth which go beyond the proximate ones — the level of investment and its efficiency — in explaining differences in growth rates. These include: entrepreneurship, learning by doing, organizational and institutional aspects related to transactions and information costs, as well as the general economic and political framework which determine the relative costs of doing business in different countries, as well as their efficiency of investment, and levels of thrift.
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Suggested Citation

  • Deepak Lal, 1991. "Why Growth Rates Differ: The Political Economy of Social Capability in 21 Developing Countries," UCLA Economics Working Papers 642, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:642
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp642.pdf
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    1. Charles Rowley & Anne Rathbone, 2013. "The political economy of antitrust," Chapters, in: Manfred Neumann & Jürgen Weigand (ed.), The International Handbook of Competition – Second Edition, chapter 6, pages 169-206, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Hayek, F. A., 2011. "The Constitution of Liberty," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226315379 edited by Hamowy, Ronald, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard M. Auty, 2006. "Patterns of Rent-Extraction and Deployment in Developing Countries: Implications for Governance, Economic Policy and Performance," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2006-16, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    2. Machín Álvarez, Alejandra, 2010. "Rentierism in the Algerian economy based on oil and natural gas," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(10), pages 6338-6348, October.
    3. Federico Sturzenegger & Mariano Tommasi, 1992. ""Deadlock" Societies, The Allocation of Time and Growth Performance," UCLA Economics Working Papers 660, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Eifert, Benn & Gelb, Alan & Borje Tallroth, Nils, 2002. "The political economy of fiscal policy and economic management in oil exporting countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2899, The World Bank.
    5. Konchyn, Vadym & Horban, Yuliia, 2016. "Экономическая Точка Бифуркации Для Украинского Олигархического Государства В Контексте Модели Стационарного Бандита [Economic Point Of Bifurcation For Ukrainian Oligarchic State In The Stationary B," MPRA Paper 70953, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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