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Testing Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study

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  • Ken Binmore
  • A. Shaked
  • J. Sutton

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Suggested Citation

  • Ken Binmore & A. Shaked & J. Sutton, 1997. "Testing Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 792, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:792
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    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4792.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Roth, Alvin E. & Malouf, Michael W. K. & Murnighan, J. Keith, 1981. "Sociological versus strategic factors in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 153-177, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Suleiman, Ramzi, 1996. "Expectations and fairness in a modified Ultimatum game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 531-554, November.

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