IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Estimates of Own Lethal Risks and Anchoring Effects

  • Olivier Armantier

The paper reports on an experiment testing whether agents perceive correctly the lethal risks they face personally. The results suggest that subjects exhibit comparable biases when making predictions for their own-age-cohort, or for the entire population (i.e. agents overestimate rare risks, and under-estimate common risks). The hypothesis that agents have better knowledge of their own risks, however, cannot be dismissed entirely, as responses in the own-age-cohort survey are more homogenous and better ordered. Finally, it is shown that administering surveys in succession can generate anchoring effects, which may explain why our conclusions differ markedly from a previous study. Ce papier rapporte les résultats d'une expérience qui cherchait à tester si les individus percevaient correctement les risques mortels auxquels ils font face personnellement. Les résultats suggèrent que la perception des sujets est autant biaisée lorsqu'ils font des prédictions pour leur propre groupe d'âge ou pour la population entière (c'est-à-dire que les individus surestiment les risques rares, et sous-estiment les risques les plus communs). Cependant, l'hypothèse que les individus possèdent une meilleure connaissance de leurs propres risques ne peut être écartée complètement puisque les réponses du sondage sur leur propre groupe d'âge sont plus homogènes et mieux ordonnées. Finalement, nous démontrons que l'administration des sondages en série a pu générer des effets d'ancrage (anchoring effects) qui pourraient expliquer le fait que nos conclusions diffèrent sensiblement d'une étude précédente.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2006s-14.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2006s-14.

as
in new window

Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 01 Sep 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2006s-14
Contact details of provider: Postal: 1130 rue Sherbrooke Ouest, suite 1400, Montréal, Quéc, H3A 2M8
Phone: (514) 985-4000
Fax: (514) 985-4039
Web page: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Gerking, Shelby & de Haan, Menno & Schulze, William, 1988. " The Marginal Value of Job Safety: A Contingent Valuation Study," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 185-99, June.
  2. Davidson, R. & Flachaire, E., 1999. "The Wild Bootstrap, Tamed at Last," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 99a32, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  3. J.Keith Murnighan & MIchael Saxon, 1998. "Ultimatum bargaining by children and adults," Artefactual Field Experiments 00100, The Field Experiments Website.
  4. Olivier Armantier, 2006. "Do Wealth Differences Affect Fairness Considerations?," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-13, CIRANO.
  5. Viscusi, W Kip, 1993. "The Value of Risks to Life and Health," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(4), pages 1912-46, December.
  6. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-38, May.
  7. Emmanuel Flachaire, 2005. "More efficient tests robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00175914, HAL.
  8. Newey, Whitney K & West, Kenneth D, 1987. "Hypothesis Testing with Efficient Method of Moments Estimation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 777-87, October.
  9. Straub, Paul G. & Murnighan, J. Keith, 1995. "An experimental investigation of ultimatum games: information, fairness, expectations, and lowest acceptable offers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 345-364, August.
  10. Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri, 2000. "Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 163-182, February.
  11. Camerer, Colin F. & Hogarth, Robin M., 1999. "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework," Working Papers 1059, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  12. Viscusi, W Kip & O'Connor, Charles J, 1984. "Adaptive Responses to Chemical Labeling: Are Workers Bayesian Decision Makers?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 942-56, December.
  13. Emmanuel Flachaire, 2005. "Bootstrapping heteroskedastic regression models: wild bootstrap vs. pairs bootstrap," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00175910, HAL.
  14. Olivier Armantier & Nicolas Treich, 2006. "Overbidding in Independant Private-Values Auctions and Misperception of Probabilities," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-15, CIRANO.
  15. Frank, Bjorn & Schulze, Gunther G., 2000. "Does economics make citizens corrupt?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 101-113, September.
  16. Chaim Fershtman & Uri Gneezy & Frank Verboven, 2005. "Discrimination and Nepotism: The Efficiency of the Anonymity Rule," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 371-396, 06.
  17. Salanie, Francois & Treich, Nicolas, 2002. "Regulating an agent with different beliefs," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt2224h6h7, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  18. Benjamin, Daniel K & Dougan, William R, 1997. "Individuals' Estimates of the Risks of Death: Part I--A Reassessment of the Previous Evidence," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 115-33, November.
  19. Bolle, Friedel, 1990. "High reward experiments without high expenditure for the experimenter?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 157-167, June.
  20. Viscusi, W Kip, 1989. " Prospective Reference Theory: Toward an Explanation of the Paradoxes," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 235-63, September.
  21. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00175910 is not listed on IDEAS
  22. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00175914 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Benjamin, Daniel K & Dougan, William R & Buschena, David, 2001. " Individuals' Estimates of the Risks of Death: Part II--New Evidence," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 35-57, January.
  24. Glenn Harrison & Elisabet Rutström, 2006. "Eliciting Subjective Beliefs about Mortality Risk Orderings," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 33(3), pages 325-346, 03.
  25. Murnighan, J. Keith & Saxon, Michael Scott, 1998. "Ultimatum bargaining by children and adults," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 415-445, August.
  26. Hakes, Jahn K & Viscusi, W Kip, 1997. "Mortality Risk Perceptions: A Bayesian Reassessment," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 135-50, November.
  27. Buchinsky, Moshe, 1994. "Changes in the U.S. Wage Structure 1963-1987: Application of Quantile Regression," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 405-58, March.
  28. Viscusi, W Kip & Hakes, Jahn K & Carlin, Alan, 1997. "Measures of Mortality Risks," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 213-33, May-June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2006s-14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Webmaster)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.