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Conflicted Minds: Recalibrational Emotions Following Trust-based Interaction

Author

Listed:
  • Eric Schniter

    (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University)

  • Roman M. Sheremeta

    (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University)

  • Timothy Shields

    (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University)

Abstract

Consistent with a modular view of the mind, both short-sighted and long-sighted programs may be simultaneously active in the mind and in conflict with one another when individuals face choice dilemmas in trust-based economic interactions. Recalibrational theory helps us identify the adaptive design features shared among subsets of superordinate emotion programs. According to this design logic and the computation of adaptive problem features produced by Trust games, we predict the activation of emotions after Trust games. While this study successfully predicts reports of twenty distinct emotional states, further studies are needed to demonstrate ultimate recalibrational functions of emotions.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Schniter & Roman M. Sheremeta & Timothy Shields, 2011. "Conflicted Minds: Recalibrational Emotions Following Trust-based Interaction," Working Papers 11-12, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:11-12
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    File URL: http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/economic-science-institute/_files/WorkingPapers/schniter-sheremeta-shields-conflicted-minds.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2013. "Overbidding And Heterogeneous Behavior In Contest Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 491-514, July.
    2. Eric Schniter & Timothy Shields, 2013. "Recalibrational Emotions and the Regulation of Trust-Based Behaviors," Working Papers 13-16, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.

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    Keywords

    emotions; recalibrational theory; modularity; Trust game; experiments;
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